Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors Failed to Effectively Regulate Mugabe\u27s Policy of Internal Displacement by Hager, Sarah E.
ZIMBABWE: WHY THE UNITED NATIONS, STATE, AND NON-
STATE ACTORS FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY REGULATE
MUGABE'S POLICY OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
SARAH E. HAGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
"The thing about President Mugabe is he's not a threat to anyone
else, but he is a terrible threat to his own people."'
1
In 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations appointed
Francis M. Deng as Representative of the Secretary-General on Inter-
nally Displaced Persons. 2 Deng's assignments were to research rele-
vant legal principles in international law and develop policy regarding
the issue of persons forced from their homes within the borders of
their home country.3 "The crisis of the internally displaced from the
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1. Australia in Legal Attack on Mugabe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Oct. 19,
2005, at 21.
2. Bruce MacLaury, Foreword to FRANCIS M. DENG, PROTECTING THE
DISPOSSESSED at v, v (1993).
3. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights
requested the secretary general to designate a representative to seek from
all governments views and information on human rights issues related to
internally displaced persons and to examine existing international human
1
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perspective of the international community is that they fall within the
domestic jurisdiction and are therefore not covered by the protection
normally accorded those who cross international borders and become
refugees."4 Subsequently, Deng submitted a document consisting of
thirty principles to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, detailing the
rights believed to be inherent for such individuals based on analogous
relevant international customary law and treaties.5 These Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement describe the internally displaced
as persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in par-
ticular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed con-
flict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border. 6
The Guiding Principles are not binding on states in the manner of a
treaty; however, "[t]heir acknowledgment in resolutions of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights and Economic and Social Council un-
derscores the moral authority they have begun to command.",7
rights mechanisms, the applicability of humanitarian and refugee law and
standards to the protection of displaced persons, and the provision of relief
assistance to them.
DENG, supra note 2, at 2.
4. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Representative of the Secretary-
General, Comprehensive Study Prepared By Mr. Francis M. Deng, Representative
Of The Secretary-General On The Human Rights Issues Related To Internally Dis-
placed Persons, Pursuant To Commission On Human Rights Resolution 1992/73,
3, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1993/35 (Jan. 21, 1993).
5. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998).
6. Id. "The Annotations of the Principles make it clear.., that this is not in-
tended as a definition, but rather a 'description' of internally displaced persons, who
do not gain special legal status as a result of being displaced." Patrick L. Schmidt,
The Process and Prospects for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
to Become Customary International Law: A Preliminary Assessment, 35 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 483, 487 (2004).
7. Francis M. Deng, Foreword to THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PROJECT ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, HANDBOOK FOR APPLYING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT at i, i (1999), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/
projects/idp/gp page.htm.
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In mid-2005, Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, initiated a
slum clearance campaign, Operation Murambatsvina, translated as
"clean up the rubbish" or "remove the filth." 8 "The main features of
the campaign are the bulldozing of townships, the burning and looting
of property and the corralling of people in the clothes they stand up in
to be trucked to unsanitary holding camps outside the cities." 9 The
government defended the operation as a clean up drive, "intended to
clean up the black market in goods and services and the illegal trade in
foreign currency ... blame[d] for causing the downfall of the econ-
omy." 0 However, the opposition party, Movement for Democratic
Change, decried this policy as an attempt to "[break up] opposition
strongholds among the urban poor." ' Further, "[m]oving millions of
people into the countryside ensures that they are utterly reliant on
government-controlled food aid for survival."' 2
Despite a sharp rebuke by the United Nations,1 3 Mugabe reached
out to South Africa by seeking assistance with his country's financial
crisis, requesting a "billion-dollar loan in order to buy emergency food
and fuel supplies."' 4 In response, South Africa's President Thabu
Mbeki "sent his deputy to strongly advise Mugabe to stop persecuting
his people and to start talking to his political opponents. '"" Further,
Mbeki conditioned the loan on Mugabe stopping his attacks on oppo-
sition supporters.' 6 Mbeki, however, faced a quandary; aid Zimbabwe
and face Western criticism, or stand firm against Mugabe's policies
8. Roger Bate, Mugabe's Last Stand; He's Destroyed His Country; Now He's
Going Begging, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 1, 2005.
9. Id. "It is estimated that more than 700,000 people have lost their homes or
businesses .... " Mugabe's Operation to Clean Up the Trash is History Repeated,
N.Z. PRESS ASS'N, July 25, 2005.
10. Bate, supra note 8.
11. Mugabe's Operation to Clean Up the Trash is History Repeated, supra
note 9.
12. Bate, supra note 8.
13. See Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zim-
babwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Spe-
cial Envoy on Human Settlement Issues in Zimbabwe (2005), available at
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/dOOO 1387/UNZimbabwe_July2005.pdf (de-
nouncing Mugabe's policy as a grave violation of human rights).
14. Bate, supra note 8.
15. Id.
16. Id.
223
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and watch Zimbabwe's economy further crumble. Mbeki stated, "[w]e
engage them because we don't want Zimbabwe collapsing next door.
South Africa would inherit all the consequences of Zimbabwe collaps-
ing. ' 17
Mugabe also looked East for another bail-out option. China was a
potential provider of a loan free of South Africa's conditions, in "re-
turn for what remains of Zimbabwe's once highly profitable tobacco
industry."' 8 Additionally, China secured agreements to allow mineral
exploration in Zimbabwe. 19 "China is neither troubled by human
rights concerns nor allegations of corruption; it is only interested in
promoting its economic interests with whoever is able and willing."
20
This Article will discuss the Guiding Principles for Internal Dis-
placement, how the Principles were derived and their basis in interna-
tional law. This Article will then apply the Principles to the situation
in Zimbabwe, discussing how effective the Principles are to police
such activity when they are only soft law. Could the United Nations
effectively police Mugabe, especially when China would likely block
any sanctions proposed by the Security Council? Could other state ac-
tors, such as South Africa, influence Mugabe to change his policies?
Finally, could non-state actors such as Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch effectively intervene through shame and blame
and public awareness techniques?
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
Worldwide estimates of the number of internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) hovers around 25 million, outnumbering refugees by a
two-to-one ratio. 21 However, the vast majority of relief efforts target
17. Mbeki Indicates He May Pay Off Mugabe's IMF Debt, AFR. NEWS (S.
Aft.), July 31, 2005.
18. Bate, supra note 8.
19. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, Why African Despots "Look East," ZIMB.
STANDARD, Aug. 7, 2005.
20. Id.
21. Francis Deng, A Decade in Human Rights Law: International Response to
Internal Displacement: A Revolution in the Making, 11 HUM. RTS. BR. 24, 24
(2004). "Africa ... has more internally displaced persons than any other continent."
Zachary A. Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and IDPs in
Africa: Making the Existing International Legal Regime Work, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 268, 271 (2000).
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refugees rather than IDPs, and there are no U.N. agencies or treaties
that specifically target this population. 22 This is a reflection of the in-
herent dilemma of assisting IDPs, who remain within the borders of
their homeland and subject to state sovereignty, when it is frequently
those same state actors engaging in the activities that trigger their dis-
placement.23 Refugee law, which is explicit in its recognition of state
sovereignty, is of little assistance.24 Conversely, human rights law
provided richer fodder in the development of the Guiding Principles
for Internal Displacement (GPID). 5
A. Grounded in International Law
The International Bill of Human Rights recognizes the "inherent
dignity and equality of all human beings and set[s] a common stan-
dard for their rights.",26 Comprised of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, these combined documents provide significant protection
for the IDPs. 27 These rights include: freedom from arbitrary interfer-
22. DENG, supra note 2, at 2.
23. Id. at 13; Luke T. Lee, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Inter-
nal Conflicts, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 529, 529 (1997).
24. Lomo states:
In contrast to refugees, internally displaced persons, who are also human
beings worthy of human rights protection, are trapped within their coun-
tries of origin. For this reason, governments are reluctant to allow the in-
ternational community to critically scrutinize the condition of IDPs under
the pretext of sovereignty, as understood in traditional international law.
Lomo, supra note 21, at 271.
25. DENG, supra note 2, at 4-5. Deng adds:
We found that existing human rights and humanitarian law already pro-
vided a great many guarantees needed by the internally displaced, but that
gray areas and gaps existed in this coverage, that the rules themselves
were scattered among numerous instruments and not easily accessible to
those who might most benefit from them, and that implementation of ex-
isting law was inadequate.
Deng, supra note 21, at 25.
26. DENG, supra note 2, at 5.
27. Id.; see also Sean Romero, Mass Forced Evictions and the Human Right to
Adequate Housing in Zimbabwe, 5 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 2007) (in-
cluding a more extended discussion of human rights law as applied to housing is-
225
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ence with family, home, and privacy; freedom from arbitrary depriva-
tion of property; and affirmative rights to adequate standards of living,
liberty, and security of person.28 Further rights afforded by these in-
struments that form the basis for current relief efforts directed towards
IDPs include rights to basic necessities such as food, clothing, housing
and medical treatment. 29
While human rights law provides a basis for asserting protection
of IDPs, it does not address issues such as forcible displacement situa-
tions nor the inability to access humanitarian relief.30 The Geneva
Conventions assure the protection of civilians during armed conflict
and "confers special status on the International Committee of the Red
Cross . . . to protect and assist victims of armed conflict."'" But the
Convention is limited in that it applies only to those displaced by
armed conflict, providing no protection for those who move because
of generalized fear of violence or who are uprooted by state actors,
such as in Zimbabwe.3 2 "Moreover, the justification for displacement
based on the need to provide security is broadly construed. 33
Finally, refugee law is of little assistance because the clarifying
distinction between refugees and IDPs is the crossing of an interna-
tional border, triggering the protections of asylum and non-
refoulement; rights recognized under international law. 34 The status
and rights of refugees developed during the Cold War, where the
original 1951 Convention was prepared against the backdrop of indi-
viduals crossing the "Iron Curtain" amidst great fanfare and propa-
sues).
28. Id. These rights are all of specific relevance to the situation in Zimbabwe.
29. Id. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention of the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the
International Conventions on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families also contain relevant guarantees along with regional instruments
such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 5-6.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. 7-8.
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ganda.35 Further, still fresh in the international consciousness was the
experience of those fleeing Nazi persecution, often refused asylum at
international borders and returned to death or concentration camp in-
carceration. 36 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
race for communist domination, "political 'persecution' of individuals
by governments has been largely replaced by human rights abuses,
ethnic conflicts, generalized violence, and other deprivations as the
root causes of displacement from or within many countries, whatever
their ideology., 37
Consequently, applicable international law only provides a
"patchwork" of imprecise human rights for IDPs:
[P]arts apply to all persons, parts only to certain subgroups of dis-
placed persons, such as those displaced as a result of armed con-
flict, and parts may not apply in certain situations, such as an emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation, or may apply only during a
state of emergency. 38
B. Extending Protections to IDPs
There has been considerable debate over the degree to which in-
ternational law should be extended to provide more concrete protec-
tions for IDPs.39 One side of the debate expresses concern that if
rights were articulated more clearly in a weak instrument or fail to be
implemented, the minimum protections available now will be lost as
35. Luke T. Lee, The London Declaration of International Law Principles on
Internally Displaced Persons, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 454, 457 (2001). "The original goal
of the UNHCR was to build a multilateral legal system designed to safeguard the
rights of individuals displaced as a result of conflicts that had taken place in Europe
and to coordinate international support for these populations." Bemma Donkoh, A
Half-Century of International Refugee Protection: Who's Responsible, What's
Ahead?, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 260, 261 (2000).
36. Deng, supra note 21, at 24.
37. Lee, supra note 35, at 457. "[T]he end of the Cold War and the strategic
withdrawal of the major powers, crises are perceived now in their proper national
and regional contexts, instead of being distorted as part of the proxy confrontations
of the Cold War era." Frances M. Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Dis-
placement, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 141, 154 (2001).
38. DENG, supra note 2, at 9.
39. Id.
227
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well. 40 Alternatively, the argument is advanced that if the current pro-
tections are deemed inadequate, then it can be construed that there is
no violation of human rights at all "because there are no clearly de-
fined standards to violate., 4' The balance struck was the development
of the GPID, a soft law document reiterating relevant human rights
and humanitarian principles as they applied to IDPs.4 2
International norms are based on standards. These norms are
guides for state action and judging behavior and are "established by
authority or gradually evolve by custom or consensus." 43 Standards
are categorized as either hard or soft law. The underlying treaties to
the GPID constitute hard law, "binding legal rules established by in-
ternational treaty or national legislation., 44 Standards often move from
soft to hard law through their acceptance as customary international
law. Customary international law "results from a general and consis-
tent practice followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation rather
than for the sake of tradition or courtesy., 45 This is usually a lengthy
and involved process, where the standard evolves over time into hard
law via a high standard of accepted practice. As the GPID was only
promulgated in 1998, there is not a rich body of history to rely upon;
however, several countries have already taken strong steps toward ap-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Schmidt states:
Soft law has been said to "operate in the grey zone between law and poli-
tics" and can be found in "treaties not yet in force or in resolutions of in-
ternational conferences or organizations, which lack legally binding qual-
ity.... .. [T]hey represent "neither strictly binding norms of law, nor
completely irrelevant political maxims."
Schmidt, supra note 6, at 514 (citing PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (7th ed. 1997)).
43. Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Govern-
ance vs. Sovereignty, 50 KAN. L. REv. 779, 780 (2002).
44. Id. at 781. Deng adds:
To the extent that they restate and/or correctly interpret existing binding
instruments, the rules expressed by the Guiding Principles are undoubtedly
binding on states party to the underlying instruments. More broadly, how-
ever, the growing acceptance of the Guiding Principles is helping them to
grow more and more "as a standard"....
Deng, supra note 21, at 26.
45. Schmidt, supra note 6, at 496.
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plying the GPID in a manner that is moving the Principles down the
path toward customary law. Angola, Burundi, and Columbia have all
incorporated the GPID into their national laws through decrees or
court cases, with several other states also moving towards applying
the GPID in national legislation.46
The GPID consists of thirty principles organized into five sec-
tions: general principles, protection from displacement; protection
during displacement; humanitarian assistance and return; and reset-
tlement and reintegration.47 The general principles reiterate that the
basis of the GPID is existing international law, explain that the princi-
ples should be applied indiscriminately, and that the initial responsi-
bility for the protection of IDPs rests with national authorities. 48 The
second set of principles, Principles Relating to Protection from Dis-
placement, make it the responsibility of all authorities and interna-
tional actors to prevent situations that lead to the development of
IDPs.49 These principles state that persons are to be protected from ar-
bitrary displacement, that if displacement cannot be avoided the state
is to provide adequate safety, nutrition, and hygiene, and that dis-
placement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the right to
life, dignity, liberty, and security.
50
Section three provides every person has a right to life and protec-
tion from violence, liberty, and security in his or her person, to not be
conscripted into civil violence, freedom of movement including seek-
ing asylum, and the right to know the whereabouts of family mem-
bers.51 Further, section three enumerates the rights of an adequate
standard of living, access to medical care, recognition before the law,
freedom of religion and expression of beliefs, and access to educa-
tion.52 The right to humanitarian assistance includes not having relief
measures diverted, that those engaged in relief efforts be protected,
that the primary responsibility for providing relief rests with national
authorities, and that offers of aid from other states or the international
46. See id. at 499-503.
47. Guiding Principles, supra note 5.
48. Id. § 1, Principles 1-4.
49. Id. § 2, Principles 5-9.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 3, Principles 10-23.
52. Id.
229
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community be considered in good faith and consent "not be arbitrarily
withheld. '53 The final section details the manner in which IDPs should
be allowed to return to their homes. IDPs "shall not be discriminated
against" and should be assisted in the recovery of their possessions or
with appropriate reparations, and international humanitarian agencies
should be allowed to assist the resettlement of IDPs.54
C. Assisting IDPs
The United Nations is not the only agency directing its attention
to the IDP crisis. The Brookings Institution published a Guidebook for
applying the GPID.55 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and other non-governmental agencies closely monitored the situation
in Zimbabwe as well as other IDP crisis situations. 56 Additionally, in
2000, the International Law Association (ILA) approved the Declara-
tion of International Law Principles on Internally Displaced Persons.57
The ILA began looking at the IDP crisis in 1992, the same year U.N.
Secretary-General Ghali appointed Francis Deng to investigate the is-
sue. In 1998, also the same year the GPID was presented to the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, the ILA committee on IDPs presented
the Draft Declaration to the ILA body. The Committee compared its
Declaration with the GPID and concluded that while the GPID is "un-
doubtedly useful as a guide," it must "nevertheless be put in [its] lim-
ited perspective."5 8 The criticism of the GPID centered on the lack of
protections provided for IDPs by failing to create a separate legal
53. Id. § 4, Principles 24-27. "The single most difficult legal challenge is how
the international community can provide humanitarian assistance to internally dis-
placed persons if their state does not consent to such assistance." Schmidt, supra
note 6, at 490.
54. Guiding Principles, supra note 5, § 5, Principles 28-30.
55. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 7. Deng was a fellow at Brookings
prior to his appointment with the United Nations.
56. Amnesty International, Mass Forced Evictions in Zimbabwe Continue
(2005), http://web.amnesty.org/wire/August2005/Zimbabwe; Human Rights Watch,
"Clear the Filth"; Mass Evictions and Demolitions in Zimbabwe (2005),
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe09O5/.
57. Lee, supra note 35, at 454.
58. LUKE T. LEE, REPORT AND DRAFT DECLARATION FOR CONSIDERATION AT
2000 CONFERENCE 5 (2000) (on file with the California Western International Law
Journal).
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status, as is provided for other human rights violations, and further,
that the GPID is not comprehensive. 59 The ILA stated the Declara-
tion's relationship to the GPID should be "characterized as mutually
supportive and reinforcing." 60 The GPID provides "eighteen articles
setting forth the rights and obligations pertaining to IDPs under gen-
eral international law, human rights law, and humanitarian law ...."61
A significant difference between the ILA Declaration and the
GPID is reflected in the definition of an IDP. The Declaration does
not include those who have been forced from their homes due to natu-
ral or human-made disaster "on the ground that disaster-related prob-
lems pertain to the economic and social realm, rather than the civil
and political sphere, and IDPs unencumbered by civil and political
problems do not find themselves in a refugee-like situation." 62 How-
ever, the Declaration later acknowledges that individuals who find
themselves displaced through these means are also deserving of hu-
manitarian rights and protections when states fail to provide the neces-
sary supports. 63 The Declaration further asserts that the most signifi-
cant right of IDPs is the protection and assistance of international and
regional human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. 64 Chief among
these protections is the "right to request and receive humanitarian as-
sistance and protection from national and de facto authorities, as well
as duly authorized international organizations." 65 The Declaration re-
iterates the GPID stance that the primary responsibility of protection
rests with the state, and that there is an obligation to receive offers of
humanitarian assistance "in good faith. ' 66
59. Id. at 2. It is unclear how an academic and research based organization of
professionals can consider their document as carrying greater authority in the inter-
national community than a document created by U.N. officials, when a large major-
ity of international hard and soft law generates from the United Nations. Further, in
the face of state and U.N. acceptance of the GPID, it appears that the Declaration
can only support the GPID rather than supplant it as the go-to document for agencies
and states in an IDP crisis.
60. Id. at 3.
61. Lee, supra note 35, at 454.
62. Id. at 455
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 456.
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D. Enforcement and Sovereignty
Enforcement of the GPID, however, raises significant concerns.
Because IDPs remain in their home country, the responsibility to pro-
vide protection and services appropriately rests with that state. 67 Fur-
ther, the U.N. Charter explicitly directs that the sovereignty of states
be protected.68 Deng, however, advances a liberal view of sovereignty,
which he contends is shared by many state actors.69 He asserts:
[W]here the government is not in control or the controlling author-
ity is unable or unwilling to create the conditions necessary to en-
sure rights, and gross violations of the rights of masses of people
result, sovereignty in the sense of responsible government is for-
feited and the international community must provide the needed
protection and assistance. 70
Other commentators have echoed his point of view: "[F]rom a lib-
eral perspective, traditional conceptions of sovereignty and how it de-
fines obligations in international law are not just changing but are an
anachronism altogether, i.e., the 'state is now widely understood to be
the servant of the people and not vice-versa.' 71 What then is the ap-
propriate situation for the international community to override state
sovereignty and intercede when a state fails to protect its citizens?
"The common assumption in international law is that to justify such
action there must be a threat to international peace., 72 Additionally,
the "weaknesses of international law and institutions as tools when po-
litical will wanes, or when States use a humanitarian response as a
substitute for political action to solve the underlying causes of dis-
67. DENG, supra note 2, at 11.
68. The Charter prohibits "[intervening] in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
69. DENG, supra note 2, at 14-15. "The concept of sovereignty.., is becoming
understood more in terms of conferring responsibilities on governments to assist and
protect persons residing in their territories, so much so that if governments fail to
meet their obligations, they risk undermining their legitimacy." Id. at 15.
70. DENG, supra note 2, at 13.
71. Lomo, supra note 21, at 278 (quoting Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen., Ad-
dress to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999)).
72. DENG, supra note 2, at 18.
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placement" demonstrate that reliance on civil society cannot solve the
problem alone.73
E. Preventing Internal Displacement
The greater challenge in protecting and servicing IDPs is prevent-
ing the situation from occurring at all. Deng states:
Viewing their problem in the context of nation building ultimately
means addressing the causes of displacement, which in many in-
stances should direct international efforts toward resolving con-
flicts, ensuring peace and security for all groups and individuals,
and equal rights of citizenship without discrimination on the
grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender. 74
Furthermore:
Much of the frustration with the failure to find long-term solu-
tions ... that have resulted in compassion fatigue would be better
directed toward urging States to address the root causes of such
movements . . . .Otherwise, the UNHCR and other humanitarian
agencies ... will continue to serve as salves to the consciences of
the States who, knowing full well that the only cure for forced dis-
placement is often aggressive pursuits of political solutions and
commitment to conflict resolution and reconstruction initiatives,
still prefer to insist on "humanitarian" solutions.
75
One scholar advances a three-pronged approach "to establish
comprehensive conflict maintenance systems at the local, national, re-
gional, and international level" in order "to prevent coerced popula-
tion movements and protect displaced persons." 76 His approach in-
cludes "conflict prevention, management, and resolution." 77 Conflict
prevention considers the "political aim" of averting or defusing con-
73. Donkoh, supra note 35, at 264.
74. DENG, supra note 2, at 13.
75. Donkoh, supra note 35, at 265.
76. Jeremy Levitt, Conflict Prevention, Managenment, and Resolution: Africa
- Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Dis-
placed Person: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD, 11 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 39, 45 (2001).
77. Id. at 45-46.
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flict through "trust building, coalition building, and negotiated settle-
ments," using "traditional and untraditional preventive diplomacy or
preventive deployment" with an end goal of ensuring adequate protec-
tion for conflict affected populations. 78 The conflict management
prong is considered "the one most integral to the physical and legal
protection of displaced people" as it "works to prevent the escalation
of refugee flows and IDPs."' 79 This is accomplished via "establish[ing]
order through intense preventive diplomacy, coercive sanctions,
peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement or humanitarian intervention"
in an attempt to "ensure peace, security, and stability to allow for vol-
untary repatriation and internal replacement. "80
Finally, conflict resolution is "the linchpin to sustainable peace."
81
This is the rebuilding stage, where IDPs are allowed to return, systems
to ensure transparency and accountability are established, and moni-
toring of the situation begins "to allow for repatriation, demobiliza-
tion, and the development of civil society and government structures,
including political and judicial processes to bring about justice and
reconciliation."8 2 The proposed underlying goal of this system is to
minimize the effect of conflict on civilian populations and attempt to
avert large displaced populations as a result of internal or regional
conflicts.83
Essentially, a tool to guide international actors through the process
of negotiating and resolving internal displacement crises exists due to
considerable academic and social attention directed at developing this
tool; a document promulgating derived rights for IDPs is available in
the body of international soft law for application when appropriate
situations arise. But will it prove effective?
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 46-47.
81. Id. at 47.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 49.
14
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III. ZIMBABWE
A. Past Political History
Cecil Rhodes, a British expatriate who cornered the South African
diamond market, expanded his reach into Zimbabwe in 1888 when he
obtained concessions to mineral rights from local chiefs.84 Eventually,
the area was declared a British protectorate and renamed Rhodesia.
85
White settlers soon followed, further exploiting mineral rights and de-
veloping large-scale agriculture ventures. By the 1950ss the European
settlers' demand for land clashed with Africans' demand for equality
in a battle similarly waged across much of Africa. Ian Smith was
elected Prime Minister in 1965 on a platform of resistance to the
United Kingdom and a push for majority rule.86 Smith promptly de-
clared unilateral independence from Britain.87
The movement for majority rule and freedom from colonial domi-
nation gathered momentum in the 1970ss with the increase in antigov-
ernment guerilla activity in Rhodesia and neighboring states.8 8 The
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was led by a dynamic
young man, Robert Mugabe, the darling of Western efforts to use Af-
rican resistance leaders to promote democracy and counteract attempts
to spread communist ideals in Africa.89 These efforts, combined with
U.N. sanctions in force for ten years, culminated in an election in
1979 that saw the installation of an African prime minister. 90 Internal
84. State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, U.S. FED. NEWS,
July 1, 2005.
85. Id. "Until 1980, Rhodesia was an internally self-governing colony with its
own legislature, civil service, armed forces, and police.... [T]he United Kingdom
always retained the right to intervene in the affairs of the colony, particularly in mat-
ters affecting Africans." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Britain made no effort to resist via force, but held the Unilateral Decla-
ration of Independence to be unconstitutional and of no force, imposing sanctions on
Rhodesia and calling for other nations to do so as well. The United Nations also held
the Declaration illegal and refused to recognize the Smith regime. Id.
88. This era saw the rise of resistance leaders who would obtain legendary
status on the continent, including Nelson Mandela, Govan Mbeki, and Robert Mug-
abe.
89. State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, supra note 84.
90. Id. Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister. Id.
15
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strife continued until British leaders negotiated the Lancaster House
Agreement, where the new Zimbabwe was transferred back to colonial
rule and then ceremoniously granted sovereignty, culminating in elec-
tions where Mugabe's party won a majority and established the new
government.9' Mugabe subsequently declared his intent to follow a
policy of reconciliation. 92
The Lancaster House Agreement attempted to deal with the land
disparity issue arising from colonial rule by requiring the prevailing
policy over the next ten years to be that land was purchased from will-
ing European settlers at fair market value.93 Subsequently, Mugabe
spent most of his first ten years in office dealing with the growing
pains of a new government, including the continuance of strife in Par-
liament with Smith and other white officials and with leaders of the
former ZANU party. 94 Elections in 1990 resulted in reelection for
Mugabe, who used his resulting political will to amend the constitu-
tion, attempting to finally turn his attention to land redistribution, in-
cluding a provision that "denied recourse to the courts in cases of
compulsory purchase of land by the government." 95
B. Recent Political History
Resistance to Mugabe's policies during the 1990ss swelled with
student protests and trade union demonstrations leading to the rise of
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as a strong opposition
party.96 This culminated in the 2000 elections that allowed MDC to
test its political strength, defeating constitutional referendums and
capturing 57 of 120 Parliamentary seats.97 However, these elections
91. Id. ZANU merged with Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) to form
the Patriotic Front, which gave rise to ZANU-PF, the name of Mugabe's political
party today. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. However, the elections were criticized by international observers as not
free and fair. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The constitutional referendums, including changes that would allow
Mugabe to seek two additional terms, granted government officials immunity from
prosecution, and authorized government seizure of white-owned land. Id.
16
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were marked by violence, corruption and intimidation, with the results
widely criticized by the United Nations and Western governments. 98
"Shortly thereafter, the government, through a loosely organized
group of war veterans, sanctioned an aggressive land redistribution
program often characterized by forced expulsion of white farmers and
violence against both farmers and farm employees." 99
The land grab, combined with pension payments to army retirees,
troop placement in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a sustained
regional drought, led to serious economic downturns in Zimbabwe.' 00
Land was redistributed to either absentee landlords or individuals in-
capable of sustaining the agricultural output potential of the land.'
Zimbabwe experienced severe food shortages and unemployment
rates estimated as high as seventy percent.' 0 2 MDC gained further
momentum in this volatile atmosphere, leading to a close presidential
election between Mugabe and MDC challenger Morgan Tsvangirai in
2002, preceded by months of violence and turmoil. 10 3 In the face of
98. Id.
99. Id. The farm occupations that began in 2000 "were initially portrayed as an
attempt by liberation war veterans and other militants to rectify racial imbalances in
land ownership." Moyiga Nduru, Whither Civil Society?, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Aug. 13, 2005.
100. See generally State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe,
supra note 84.
101. See generally id.
102. Simon Tisdall, Zimbabwe Surrounded By Sound and Fury, but Little Ac-
tion, THE GUARDIAN (London) Nov. 8, 2005, at 22. "Various estimates suggest food
shortages now affect half the population; 4 million people face famine. Average life
expectancy has halved in a decade, the economy has contracted by 30% in six years,
and unemployment is about 70%." Id.
103. State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, supra note 84.
As a result of this election, the United States and European Union imposed travel
restrictions, and the Commonwealth of Nations suspended Zimbabwe from council
meetings, leading to its eventual withdrawal.
The United States, however, imposed financial and investment sanctions
under the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 in
which it has instructed all its officials who sit on the boards of interna-
tional financial institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund and others to oppose any financial assistance to Zim-
babwe.
Zimbabwe Press Review for 5 November; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, THE HERALD
(Zimb.), Nov. 5, 2005.
237
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this, Mugabe tightened his control with repressive legislation limiting
speech and assembly, and used controlled food distribution to sway a
starving electorate in the run up to Parliamentary elections in March
2005. 104
C. Operation Murambatsvina
It was in this atmosphere that Operation Murambatsvina com-
menced on May 19, 2005. The stated governmental purpose was to
"rid urban areas of illegal structures, illegal business enterprises, and
criminal activities. '  There was little warning of the impending ur-
ban cleansing.' 0 6 A speech by a governmental representative an-
nounced the intended effort but did not mention its method, other than
it would be conducted in conjunction with the police force.'0 7 Five
days later, notice was provided to the residents of Harare that indi-
viduals who had constructed illegal structures must voluntarily demol-
ish them by June 20, 2005.108 However, on May 25, bulldozers and
police tore through shantytowns in Harare's high-density suburbs, ini-
tially targeting vendor and flea markets, and "other informal market
premises" before moving on to illegal dwellings.'0 9 Structures were
demolished by any means, including burning. 1 0 It is estimated that up
to 700,000 people lost homes and livelihoods in the Operation, con-
ducted on the verge of winter, leaving these individuals exposed to the
104. State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, supra note 84.
105. Id. Indeed,
[t]he Government of Zimbabwe has given the following main justifica-
tions for the Operation: arresting disorderly or chaotic urbanization, in-
cluding its health consequences; stopping illegal, parallel market transac-
tions, especially in foreign currency dealing and hoarding of consumer
commodities in short supply; and reversing environmental damage caused
by inappropriate urban agricultural practices.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 20.
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. It is disputed whether all of the structures destroyed were actually ille-
gal. Jupiter Punungwe, Why Murambatsvina is a Disaster, ZIMB. STANDARD, July
31, 2005.
110. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 12.
18
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elements."' Those displaced were ordered to return to their "rural ori-
gins," which for many affected did not exist, as they were immigrants
or had lived in urban areas so long there were no longer ties to rural
commufnities.1 12
Several theories were advanced as to why the government insti-
tuted this action. The prevailing theory is that it was an attempt by
Mugabe's regime to further clamp down on MDC supporters by dis-
persing power centers, as urban areas were enclaves for MDC sup-
port.' l3 However, in October 2005, a magazine published by a sup-
porter of Mugabe revealed that the Operation was spearheaded by the
Zimbabwe intelligence community, spurred by fears of a popular up-
rising on the scale of the Ukraine's "orange revolution."
1
'
1 4
Whatever the motive, the effect was disastrous. Surveys by non-
governmental agencies of 81,955 residents of Harare revealed that
seventy-six percent of those interviewed reported loss of shelter and
income, in addition to a decrease in school attendance of twenty-two
percent by children of affected parents." 5 Residents were moved to
holding camps to await dispersal into rural areas, however, several
months later many were still sleeping on the ground in the open. 116
There was no access to potable water, food provisions were scarce,
women gave birth in the open, the disabled lost access to care provi-
sions and disease was rampant.' 17
111. Id. at 33.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Mugabe's Operation to Clean Up the Trash is History Repeated, supra
note 9.
114. Murambatsvina CIO Brainchild, FIN. GAZETTE (Zimb.), Oct. 6, 2005.
This refutes earlier statements by government officials that "both Operation Muram-
batsvina [anti-filth] and Operation Garikai .. .were planned a long time ago."
State's Demolition Programme "Beginning to Bear Fruit" (text of report on ZTV1,
Harare, July 28, 2005) BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., July 29, 2005.
115. Impact of Demolitions Greater than Government's New Plan, U.N.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, July 25, 2005.
116. Get Thabo's Cash and Run, ZIMB. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2005. "We were
living crammed like rats, the tents were inhabited by the police and not just any-
body." Thomas Kwaramba, Government Admits Blunder on Hatcliffe, ZIMB.
STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2005.
117. Christina Lamb, 'Dust People' Forage for Food in Zimbabwe Ruins,
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 23, 2005, at 24.
239
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Additionally, the Operation exacerbated the AIDS crisis in Zim-
babwe. 1 8 With one of the highest infection rates in the world, many
residents are in need of medical assistance and medications, already
difficult for Zimbabweans to access.' 9 For those relocated to rural ar-
eas and holding camps, reaching these services became an impossibil-
ity, leading to greater symptomology and future resistance to anti-
retroviral medications. 20 Finally, the potential added risks of in-
creased sexual violence frequently observed in vulnerable populations
and prostitution due to lack of other income sources could increase the
spread of HIV.1
21
D. Operation Garikai
Following the international outcry against Operation Restore Or-
der, the government attempted to back pedal and announced on June
29, 2005 the launching of Operation Garikai, a housing development
plan to rebuild houses on state determined sites.' 22 Zimbabwe an-
nounced that 33,000 houses were to be built in the Harare area alone,
with the equivalent of $30 million allocated toward the project. 23 Fur-
ther, determination of recipients of the homes would not be decided
based upon political affiliation. 124 Coincidentally, Operation Garikai
was announced during the United Nations' Special Envoy's ultimately
highly critical tour of Zimbabwe.' 25 Special Envoy Anna Kajumulo
Tibaijuka determined in her report that the stated goals were implausi-
ble based upon the present capabilities of the Zimbabwean govern-
118. Paul Salopek, Zimbabwe Policies Thwart HIV Victims Seeking Help, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 7, 2005.
119. Id.
120. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 40.
121. Id.
122. Msika Officially Launches Operation Garikai, THE HERALD (Zimb.), June
30, 2005.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Special Envoy to visit
Zimbabwe in June 2005 and report on the conditions following Operation Muram-
batsvina. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
20
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ment, including lack of resources, refusal of foreign assistance and its
budgetary crisis. 
126
It appears as if her reservations were well founded. The initial tar-
get completion date of August 30, 2005 came and went with few
homes turned over to recipients. 127 By the end of July, the regime that
had previously refused foreign aid requested assistance with the re-
construction. 128 The Minister of Local Government, Public Works and
Urban Development, infuriated at the slow pace of the building,
threatened to deploy soldiers in September. 129 Finally, the houses con-
structed were shells, requiring the new owner to outlay precious re-
sources in order to finish construction; this on top of the initial cash
deposit required to take possession.1 30 These requirements function-
ally placed these new dwellings out of the financial reach of most of
those displaced.
126. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 49, 74.
127. Row Erupts Over 'Hlalani Kuhle' Houses in Gwanda, ZIMB. STANDARD,
Sept. 25, 2005. However, diplomats from the Non-Aligned Movement, including
representatives from China and Russia, toured Zimbabwe in September and issued a
favorable report on the progress of Operation Garikai, but made no statement about
Operation Murambasvina. Non-aligned Diplomats Hail Progress of Zimbabwe's Re-
housing Programme, (ZTV1 television broadcast Sept. 12, 2005).
128. Government Declares 'Clean Up' Operation Over, THE HERALD (Zimb.),
July 28, 2005. "I appeal to the international community to stop stone-throwing, but
to join us in this noble effort to promote the good of our people." Id. Zimbabwe has
requested help from the international community with the thousands of people made
homeless by Operation Murambatsvina, despite initial insistence that it was capable
of addressing the situation internally. Bill Corcoran, Cruel To Be Kind, SLATE
MAGAZINE, July 1, 2005.
129. Chombo Threatens Military Action, ZIMB. STANDARD, Sept. 11, 2005. It
was reported that of 200 houses targeted for completion at the end of August 2005,
most would not be available. Id. However, it is unclear if this refers to a specific re-
gion only or the country in its entirety. The government reported that some houses
had been completed.
130. Olly Owen, Zimbabwe's Dispossessed Excluded from Housing Rebuild,
WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Sept. 12, 2005. As a result, ninety-eight percent of the
homes in Bulawayo were allocated to members of the army, police and security ser-
vices. Id.
21
Hager: Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors Fai
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
242 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
IV. MUGABE'S VIOLATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS'
DISAPPOINTING RESPONSE
A. The Special Envoy's Report
Secretary-General Annan appointed Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka,
Executive Director of U.N. Habitat, as Special Envoy on Human Set-
tlement Issues. Her mandate was to report on the effects of Operation
Murambatsvina and present recommendations. 3 ' The authority of
Special Envoys derives from the good offices of the Secretary-
General. As early as 1946, Secretaries-General have made clear that
the office has powers independent of the Security Council and General
Assembly to investigate, mediate, and negotiate matters involving
state actors. 132 By the 1980ss, Secretaries General "[h]ad created for
themselves a dispute-settlement role separate and often different from
the expressed policy of some, or even most, members.... [T]hey had
been completely successful in drawing a line between their role and
the role played by the political organs at the behest of member
states."' 133 However, "[t]he Secretary-General cannot be everywhere at
once," and frequently must delegate such tasks, especially in the post-
Cold War era where there has been a dramatic increase in the number
of situations requiring good offices intervention. 134 Authority for good
offices functions arises either by agreement of the parties, under the
inherent power of the Secretary-General Office, or by Security Coun-
cil or General Assembly resolution.' 35 Therefore, a Secretary-General
can appoint a Special Envoy to investigate or mediate a conflict or one
can be appointed by resolution from the Security Council or General
Assembly.
131. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 2.
132. Thomas M. Franck & Georg Nolte, The Good Offices Function of the UN
Secretary General, in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD 143, 144 (Adam Roberts
& Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1993).
133. Id. at 148.
134. Id. at 176-77.
135. Id. at 172-73.
22
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The international acceptance of Special Envoys is interesting. 136
Marginal states such as Sudan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Zimbabwe all al-
lowed Special Envoys to enter their sovereign borders and rarely re-
stricted their access, providing access to parties that NGO's and other
actors were denied and promoting the appearance that these envoys
are afforded tremendous validity. On the other hand, why not allow
them access? Special Envoys have no true authority. Did it really hurt
President Mugabe to allow Tibaijuka free reign? Her report had no
binding effect. Similarly, even if Secretary-General Annan himself
traveled to Zimbabwe and wrote the report, it would have no binding
effect. However, the Charter provides the Secretary-General with the
authority to bring any matter before the Security Council he feels is a
threat to international peace and security. 137 Because Tibaijuka was
appointed directly by Annan, he could then bring her report before the
Security Council, or alternatively, the Security Council could vote
whether to have the report brought before it. President Mugabe likely
rolled the dice, knowing he was not in violation of binding hard law
and not directly threatening other states with his actions, counting on
his allies to block any potential Security Council action.
The Special Envoy generated a 100-page report after meeting with
President Mugabe, other government officials, displaced persons,
NGO's, and civil society groups.' 38 However, she did not apply the
Guiding Principles in her report.' 39 She expressed concerns that the
136. Much of how the good offices of the Secretary-General function is not in
the U.N. Charter but all states acknowledge the Secretary-General has this role and
respects it, now explicitly in the World Summit document. G.A. Res. 60/1, [ 76,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
137. U.N. Charter art. 99.
138. See Tibaijuka, supra note 13. Zimbabwe's national paper reported that
Special Envoy Tibaijuka confessed to Mugabe that she was under pressure to gener-
ate a negative report from her observations. Political Hand Grips Tibaijuka's Pen,
THE HERALD (Zimb.), July 28, 2005.
139. The GPID is mentioned only twice in her report. She states:
There is an urgent need to reach an understanding with the Government on
the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, the status of people dis-
placed by the Operation, and the policies and standards that will govern
humanitarian response, including the SPHERE standards and the U.N.
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 52. "Furthermore, the organized transport of people to
and from the camp was reported to be involuntary in many cases, which would not
243
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scope of the problem was beyond the ability of the Zimbabwean gov-
ernment to correct, but hesitated to say that the Responsibility to Pro-
tect was triggered by the situation.1 40 Finally, the Special Envoy con-
cluded that, despite its actions, with the available evidence it would be
difficult to prove that Zimbabwe has violated international hard law
prohibiting "crimes against humanity."' 41 Zimbabwe is not party to
the Rome Statute, so any determination that Zimbabwe was in viola-
tion of Article 7 for crimes against humanity would require referral to
the U.N. Security Council for a determination of action. 142 The Spe-
cial Envoy determined that Zimbabwe's violations were predomi-
nantly of national law, but conversely "[t]he international community
has a responsibility to protect those affected. The impact will not be
easy to redress and requires immediate large-scale and unconditional
humanitarian assistance to protect those in need." 143
However, Operation Murambatsvina and its aftermath created a
large population of IDPs within the borders of Zimbabwe, in addition
be in accordance with the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as well
as other international instruments." Id. at 53.
140. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 64. "The Responsibility to Protect published
in December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sov-
ereignty, outlines the core principles of how the United Nations and the wider inter-
national community should react when nations are degenerating into chaos." Id. This
document is also soft law and has no binding effect on states, but was expressly ac-
cepted by resolution at the World Summit meeting in 2005. See generally G.A. Res.
60/1, 1 76, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
141. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 67.
142. Id. at 64. Russia, China and Tanzania have all indicated they would veto
any Resolution against Zimbabwe. China, Tanzania Thwart Efforts to Put Zim-
babwe on UN Agenda, (Zimbabwean Television broadcast July 26, 2005) (transcript
available at www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=187833 (last visited on Jan. 10,
2007)).
143. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 64.
[I]t remains the strong recommendation of the Envoy that the culprits who
have caused this man-made disaster be brought to book under Zimbab-
wean national laws. The international community would then continue to
be engaged with the dismal human rights record in Zimbabwe in consen-
sus building political forums such as the U.N. High Commission for Hu-
man Rights, or its successor, the African Union Peer Review Mechanism,
and the SADC [Southern African Development Community].
Id. at 67.
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to those displaced in earlier operations. 144 In doing so, at least twelve
of the Guiding Principles were clearly violated by the Mugabe regime
in its effort to return Harare to its previous status as the "Sunshine
City.' 45 The GPID, as opposed to many soft law documents, explic-
itly details what constitutes a violation, with few of the Principles pro-
viding only vague aspirations. As a result, it is easy to run through a
checklist of violations produced by the actions of the Mugabe gov-
ernment, which makes it only more puzzling that Tibaijuka failed to
do so.
B. U.N. Failure
The United Nations' handling of the Zimbabwe situation raises
several critical questions regarding how it will continue to address
situations of internal displacement. Why was an employee of U.N.
Habitat sent to Zimbabwe to report on the crisis rather than Walter
Kilin, the current Representative of the Secretary-General on the Hu-
man Rights of Internally Displaced Persons? Why did the Special En-
voy fail to explicitly enumerate the egregious violations of the GPID
in her report? What was Kofi Annan's role in approaching Zim-
babwe's human rights violations and what should have been his role?
In 2004, Walter Kalin replaced Frances Deng as Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons. 146 The current mandate of the position is to engage in coordi-
nated advocacy in favor of the protection and respect of the human
rights of IDPs; continue and enhance dialogues with governments as
well as non-governmental organizations and other actors; and
strengthen the international response to internal displacement and
mainstream the human rights of IDPs into all relevant parts of the
144. See Mugabe's Operation to Clean Up the Trash is History Repeated, N.Z.
PREss ASS'N, July 25, 2005.
145. See table in the Appendix that enumerates those Principles most clearly
violated. All excerpts utilized as evidence of a violation are taken directly from the
observations of the Special Envoy in her report.
146. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, Rep-
resentative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons (1996-2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/idp/man
date.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
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U.N. system. 147 This includes visiting countries with current internal
displacement issues and promoting awareness and discussion regard-
ing the GPID. 148 From the start of Deng's tenure to present, there have
been twenty-eight country visits undertaken by a Representative on
Internal Displacement, none of which was Zimbabwe. 149
If Klin's mandate is to promote the rights of the internally dis-
placed and strengthen international response and recognition of the
GPID as a relevant tool, why did he not visit Zimbabwe himself? 5 °
147. Id. The U.N. representative also states:
He was also requested to build upon the work of his predecessor in raising
awareness of IDP rights issues, promoting and disseminating the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels, undertaking country missions, convening national and re-
gional seminars, providing support for capacity building of non-
governmental organizations and other relevant institutions, and conducting
policy-oriented research.
Id. (citation omitted).
148. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, Rep-
resentative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons: Country Visits (1996-2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/
issues/idp/visits.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
Country visits are a particularly important aspect of the mandate as they
provide a means for assessing the extent to which the protection needs of
the internally displaced are being met in specific situations and for engag-
ing with Governments, non-state actors, international and local humanitar-
ian agencies, local civil society, displaced persons, and other interested ac-
tors.
Id.
149. See id. Walter Klin "has undertaken visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina
(June 2005), Croatia (June 2005), Nepal (April 2005), [and] Serbia and Montenegro
(June 2005) ... " Id.
150. E-mail from Paul Oertly, representative to Walter Kalin, to Sarah Hager,
author, (Nov. 30, 2005) (on file with author). A representative for Kalin was con-
tacted via e-mail inquiring as to why Kalin did not conduct the country visit and
why Tibaujuka did not discuss the GPID in her report. Id. His entire response fol-
lows:
Thank you for your inquiry. The position of Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons is an
independent mandate, and as such the Representative was not involved in
either the appointment decision of Ms. Tibaijuka or his [sic] report. You
may have noted that he is on the public record with respect to the subject
matter, see for example his press release of 29 July 2005.
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Clearly, as executive director of U.N. Habitat, Tibaijuka is an expert
on housing issues.1 51 But it raises the question as to whether she is an
expert on displacement issues, evidenced by her lack of discussion of
the GPID in her report. If Kdilin has no say in who is sent to report on
countries that appear to be violating the GPID, or what is discussed in
the report, then why does his position exist? Alternatively, was the
motivation political for appointing Tibaijuka as representative of hu-
man settlement issues rather than using stronger language regarding
the internal displacement issue?152 Perhaps this was an attempt to
make the envoy visit more palatable to President Mugabe by keeping
the appointment focused on what appeared to be a less politically-
charged level and to avoid the issue of state sovereignty raised by the
GPID. If so, Annan's actions directly undercut both Kain and the
GPID's potential to gain acceptance as a standard.
Kilin appeared to delicately convey his irritation in a published a
press release following the issuance of the Special Envoy report,
where he expressly invoked the violation of the GPID by Zimbabwe.
What has been suspected has now become clear following the re-
port of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy Anna Tibaijuka last
Friday: in Zimbabwe we are facing a situation of massive internal
displacement," Mr. Kalin said. . . . "Destruction of homes and
forced movement of people on such a scale comes squarely within
the definition of internal displacement, which covers people forced
to leave their homes to avoid human rights violations and other dis-
asters, whether human-made or natural"...... The UN's Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement set forth the rights of internally
displaced persons under international law and the obligations of
States. "These Principles ...are based upon and reflect human
rights obligations also accepted by Zimbabwe." They protect
against arbitrary displacement in the first place and require due
process, adequate notice, appropriate relocation and minimisation
151. One wonders about potential political motivations in considering ap-
pointments. Klin is a citizen of Switzerland, a Western country. Switzerland did not
join the United Nations until 2002 and is famously neutral; alternatively, Tibaijuka
is a citizen of Tanzania, a country that sits on the Security Council and is a close
neighbor of Zimbabwe. Was Annan concerned with sending a representative that
may have been viewed as more palatable to President Mugabe?
152. Tibaijuka's appointment appears to have been specific to Zimbabwe, not
all issues of human settlement, as her mandate was only to investigate the situation
in Zimbabwe.
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of adverse effects. They also require appropriate provision of the
necessities of life to displaced persons, protection of their property,
as well as offer voluntary choices to displaced persons as to where
they will return. "On each and every of these points, the Govern-
ment of Zimbabwe has fallen far short of its obligations."' 153
This is the language that should have been in the Special Envoy
report. Kilin reiterates the legitimacy of the GPID as based on binding
documents Zimbabwe has ratified and applies the actualities of the
situation to violations of the GPID. It seems an attempt to fill the holes
left by Tibaijuka's analysis, further his mandate by promoting the
GPID and validate the existence of his position. Sadly, for whatever
reason, this was not done initially, leaving instead a glaring failure of
opportunity on the part of the United Nations to advance the rights of
IDPs through applying the Principles to a particularly egregious viola-
tion. 154
But is there another reason why Tibaijuka did not discuss the
GPID? As soft law, there is no binding force for violations of the
GPID. It is possible her reticence was colored by the same debate that
informed the genesis of the GPID as soft law; whether to risk losing
any rights for IDPs by having the instrument not enforced. 155 Alterna-
tively, it can be argued that a valuable opportunity was missed to ad-
vance the GPID through using the report to generate discussions that
could initiate a norm shift.
Cass Sunstein describes the process of norm shifting to advance
societal change. 5 6 He states that a norm entrepreneur proposes a
change in a current socially accepted status quo, such as stating that
the policy of separate but equal is actually a policy of racism. Because
there are many people who will not want to be perceived as racist,
153. Press Release, United Nations, U.N. Representative Calls Zimbabwe Cri-
sis Massive Internal Displacement (July 29, 2005).
154. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE (2005), http://hrw.org/reports/2005/ziml205/2.htm#_
Toc120427991. Human Rights Watch called Kiin to visit Zimbabwe "to raise
awareness of and attention to the plight of the internally displaced, and work with
the government and the U.N. to ensure the delivery of assistance and protection to
the internally displaced persons." Id.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
156. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
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they will endorse this new norm. Others will follow, exiting the policy
of separate schools, embracing desegregation, and generating a norm
cascade. In order for this to work, there needs to be a societal norm
that can be exited; if a person or policy is trapped in a norm cycle, the
policy will stagnate and remain at status quo. Here, by using the pub-
lic voice of the Secretary-General via the Special Envoy, there was the
opportunity to name sovereign-dictated internal displacement as a vio-
lation of the GPID, worthy of international scorn as an infringement of
an instrument that restates other accepted human rights violations,
moving the GPID closer to acceptance as a standard.
There is evidence that the influence of the GPID is gaining speed
which naming Operation Murambatsvina as violative of the Principles
could have assisted. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly
at the U.N. World Summit in September 2005 explicitly endorsed the
GPID as a vital document to assist in the protection of IDPs.157 Addi-
tionally, other state actors expressed strong condemnation of Opera-
tion Murambatsvina. However, since the report concluded that the ac-
tions were only violations of national law, there is little force with
which these other state actors could move forward and much force
with which others could resist these efforts. Britain, Greece, Australia,
and New Zealand all moved to have the Special Envoy report placed
on the Security Council agenda, but were blocked in their efforts by
China, Russia, and Tanzania.1 58 Australia also pushed for Mugabe to
be tried before the International Criminal Court. 159
157. G.A. Res. 60/1, 132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). "We rec-
ognize the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as an important international
framework for the protection of internally displaced persons and resolve to take ef-
fective measures to increase the protection of internally displaced persons." Id.
158. Blessing Zulu, Britain Requests Security Council Zimbabwe Briefing,
U.S. FED. NEWS, July 26, 2005.
Britain raised the issue of Zimbabwe in a closed session of the Security
Council. Britain wanted the special envoy to detail her findings to the
Council. Mugabe was in China seeking financial assistance and firming up
diplomatic support with Beijing, which if it so inclined could shield him
from Security Council sanctions.
Id.; see also Mbeki Indicates He May Pay Off Mugabe's IMF Debt, supra note 17.
The countries that voted against Britain's request to bring the Special Envoy report
before the Security Council were China, Russia, Algeria, Benin, and Tanzania. Nine
voted in favor with one abstention, Brazil. Id.
159. "Australia is pressing the world's most powerful nations to put Zim-
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Western states also appealed directly to Mugabe to cease his dis-
placement actions and recognize the economic and social peril facing
Zimbabwe. 160 However, Mugabe boldly faced down Western detrac-
tors and the United Nations, secure in knowing that, with the Special
Envoy's conclusion that his recent actions only breached national
laws, the international community is limited in its recourse. Mugabe
addressed the Security Council while in New York in September 2005
for the World Summit, saying the Security Council "must not be used
as a tool to score cheap political points, but should limit itself to its
stated mandate."' 6' He further declared, "Zimbabwe was a country at
peace with itself and its neighbours and posed absolutely no threat to
international peace and security."' 162
Additionally, Zimbabwe defended Operation Murambatsvina as
no different than actions of other countries throughout the world. 163 In
fact, this is not an entirely incorrect statement of what has occurred,
and continues to occur, in other states. Zimbabwe is not alone in clear-
ing its slums in an attempt to rejuvenate its cities. "[B]eautification
projects immediately prior to international events are one of the most
common justifications for slum clearance programs."' 64 Prior to the
babwe's brutal dictator Robert Mugabe on trial in the International Criminal
Court... . [T]he government was pushing the UN Security Council to refer Mr [sic]
Mugabe and his henchmen to the global court." Zimbabwe is not a signatory of the
court so Mugabe can only be prosecuted by a resolution of the Security Council.
Australia in Legal Attack on Mugabe, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Oct. 19, 2005.
160. "Thirteen western governments including Britain issued a joint statement
in Harare at the weekend demanding Mr. Mugabe accept that Zimbabwe faced a
deepening crisis, caused in part by the government's urban clearance opera-
tion .... Tisdall, supra note 102.
161. Britain Abusing UN to Score Cheap Political Points, Says President, THE
HERALD (Zimb.), Sept. 19, 2005. Mugabe further stated that he did not "subscribe to
the suggestion that all problems-social, cultural, economic, and health, among oth-
ers-were necessarily threats to the maintenance of peace and security, and that they
should, therefore, be referred to the Security Council." Id.
162. Id. "Mugabe said it was disheartening to note that Zimbabwe was being
persecuted for improving the livelihoods of its people by forces that were behind
massive human rights abuses and blatant disregard of the UN charter provisions
typified by the invasion of Iraq by the US and Britain." China, Tanzania Thwart Ef-
forts to Put Zimbabwe on UN Agenda, supra note 142.
163. Mugabe Backed Into a Corner, FIN. MAIL (S. Aft.), July 29, 2005, at 26.
164. Solomon J. Greene, Note, Staged Cities: Mega-Events, Slum Clearance,
and Global Capital, 6 YALE HUM.RTS. & DEv. L.J. 161, 163 (2003).
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IMF and World Bank conference in Bangkok in 1991, Thailand forci-
bly removed more than 2,000 slum dwellers from the area around the
convention center.' 65 When the same convention convened in 1976 in
Manila, 400 families experienced the same forcible removal to obfus-
cate the existence of these slum residents. 66 In the five years preced-
ing the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, 48,000 buildings that housed
720,000 people were demolished to make way for redevelopment.' 67
"Ninety percent of the 720,000 evictees did not receive replacement
housing within the redevelopment site."'
68
Mega-events (large scale leisure and tourism events such as Olym-
pic Games and World Fairs) are short-term events with long-term
consequences for the cities that stage them. They are associated
with the creation of infrastructure and event facilities often carrying
long-term debts and always requiring long-term use programming.
In addition, if successful, they project a new (or renewed) and per-
haps persistent and positive image and identity for the host city
through national and international media. 169
The significant difference between Zimbabwe and these other
countries, however, is that Zimbabwe does not have a large-scale
event planned now, or any time in the near future. Further, the slum
clearances initiated for large-scale events tend to be isolated to those
areas most near the event site. Operation Murambatsvina destroyed
homes in twenty-nine urban centers across Zimbabwe. The limited
economic benefit of a less congested city center does not balance
against the loss of home and livelihood for more than half a million
people.
Mugabe invited Secretary-General Annan to visit Zimbabwe to
view the effects of Operation Murambatsvina and subsequent Opera-
tion Garikai.170 However, Annan set conditions for the visit, "that the
government allows aid groups into the country and gives them unfet-
165. Id. at 161.
166. Id. at 161-62.
167. Id. at 171.
168. Id. at 172.
169. Id. at 165.
170. Rangarirai Mberi, Annan Sticks to Conditions for Zim Visit, FIN. GAZETTE
(Zimb.), Sept. 22, 2005.
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tered access to feed the hungry," which Mugabe refused to meet.
1 71
Annan also requested that his Chief Coordinator of Humanitarian Op-
erations be allowed to visit Zimbabwe, with which Mugabe agreed.
172
However, Zimbabwe continued to insist that Annan has no authority
to interfere with its sovereignty.
73
The good offices of the Secretary-General are a concept that de-
rived over the history of the United Nations but is not explicitly enu-
merated in the U.N. Charter. 174 However, broad support has developed
for the role of the Secretary-General as a third party negotiator in dis-
putes between states. 175 The success of the Secretary-General's office
at preventative diplomacy is well recognized, and yet the extent to
which it is utilized is not fully known, as much of the efforts take
place behind closed doors.
176
However, Secretaries-General also use the weight of their position
to make policy statements regarding current issues. 7 7 Annan re-
sponded to the Special Envoy report by condemning the activities of
the Zimbabwean government. "It is a profoundly distressing re-
port.... I call on the Government to stop these forced evictions and
demolitions immediately, and to ensure that those who orchestrated
this ill-advised policy are held fully accountable for their actions.'' 1
7 8
"In a no-holds-barred statement ... Annan said he was gravely con-
cerned by the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe as it emerged that
thousands of people were still sleeping in the open and in urgent need
of aid five months after the beginning of the government's controver-
171. Id.
172. Id. The U.N. relief coordinator is expected to visit Harare in December
2005. Njabulo Ncube, New UN Envoy for Zim, FIN. GAZETTE (Zimb.), Nov. 9, 2005.
173. Mberi, supra note 170.
174. Alys Brehio, Good Offices of the Secretary-General as Preventative
Measures, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 589, 595-96 (1998).
175. Id. at 596.
176. Id. at 598.
177. Annan has condemned Operation Murambatsvina, has urged the ratifica-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol in the face of United States refusal to do so, and issued
statements about events in Darfur, Kosovo and other regions. Annan most recently
condemned statements made by Iran's president refuting the Holocaust. See Annan
questions Iran Holocaust exhibit, USA TODAY, Sept. 3, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-02-iran-cartoonsx.htm.
178. UN Orders Halt to Demolitions, ZIMB. STANDARD, July 24, 2005.
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sial clean-up exercise." 179 On the other hand, "United Nations Secre-
tary-General Kofi Annan ...also spurned the Greek attempts [to
place the Special Envoy report before the Security Council] making it
clear that it was his report and he alone knew what to do with it, when
and how."' 180
As Secretary-General, Annan was essentially limited to drawing
attention to the crisis and using his good offices to intervene. This he
has done. However, arguably Annan missed a valuable opportunity to
promote the GPID by failing to send Kilin to Zimbabwe to report
rather than Tibaijuka. It would be interesting to learn the factors An-
nan weighed in making this decision that balanced in favor of sending
a U.N. Habitat representative rather than the Internally Displaced Per-
sons representative to report on Zimbabwe's crisis.
V. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
Because the Guiding Principles are soft law recommendations,
there is no clear mechanism to call Zimbabwe to task for its viola-
tions. Instead, the international community must resort to sanctions
and condemnation. There has been a call for two countries in particu-
lar to play a key role in bringing the weight of their relationship to
bear on the Mugabe regime, China and South Africa.
A. South Africa
South Africa is Zimbabwe's neighbor to the immediate south,
sharing a rather fluid border. In recent years, South Africa's president
Thabo Mbeki has attempted to practice quiet diplomacy in his rela-
tions with Zimbabwe.' 81 There are several reasons for this tactic. First,
a shared history of colonial oppression and harsh race relations in-
flicted by Western superpowers creates a common bond. Second,
179. Ncube, supra note 172.
180. China, Tanzania Thwart Efforts to Put Zimbabwe on UN Agenda, supra
note 142.
181. "Mbeki has long maintained that Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and active
interference in its domestic affairs would be misguided." Loan Request Gives SA
Leverage to Press for Change, U.N. INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, July
18, 2005.
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South Africa is Zimbabwe's largest trading partner in Africa.' 82 Com-
pounding this, due to its geographical location, in order for South Af-
rica to reach many of its trading partners further north, it is necessary
to traverse Zimbabwe, necessitating continued good relations.
"South Africa is, in fact, Robert Mugabe's best and last remaining
friend in the world."' 183 Mbeki and Mugabe are compatriots from a
generation of vast change in the political landscape of Africa. 18 4 Con-
sequently, there is a sense of shared history and camaraderie between
the two nations and an impression of political debts owed. President
Mbeki recently revealed the following information:
[W]hen South Africa was negotiating its transition to democracy
around the time when Zimbabwe planned to speed up its land re-
form [in the early 1990s, the same time the Lancaster House
agreement expired], a Commonwealth official asked Harare not to
drastically change its programme as it would "frighten the apartheid
government in South Africa."' 185
Such revelations provide vital links in understanding the delicate
balance of diplomacy in the region and how the past continues to color
the future.' 86
However, South Africa is in a unique position in Africa, particu-
larly sub-Saharan Africa, as the economic powerhouse of the region
with strong political clout in the West.1 87 South Africa possesses the
182. Shakeman Mugari, West Still Major Trading Partner Despite Look East
Policy, ZIMB. INDEP., Sept. 23, 2005.
183. Tony Leon, Why South Africa Backs Mugabe, THE SPECTATOR (U.K.),
Oct. 15, 2005, at 20.
184. "The two presidents are two African brothers who are fully aware of the
bloody struggles that not only Zimbabwe, but many countries in Africa went
through in their fight against colonialism and apartheid." The SA, Nigeria, and MDC
Connection, THE HERALD (Zimb.), Nov. 6, 2005.
185. Mbeki Indicates He May Pay Off IMF Debt, supra note 17.
186. The ANC, President Mbeki's ruling party, "too often continues to view all
politics through the lens of the national liberation struggle, identifying racism as the
basic problem and solidarity as the only answer." Jeffrey Herbst, Mbeki's Big Mis-
take South Africa, THE INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Oxford, OH), Oct. 27, 2005, at 6.
187. "We are the Silicon Valley of the continent. We invest more in the eco-
nomic development of southern Africa than any other country in the world." Nor-
man Levine, Rising South Africa Called 'Catalyst' for Continent's Progress; Re-
gional Clout, Industrial Gains Propel Agenda, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at A17.
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potential to shape the dimensions of policy in southern Africa through
its economic force and strong example of progressive social poli-
cies. 188 "For good or ill, the rise of South Africa as the powerhouse of
the continent has captured the imagination of people from the Sahara
to the Cape."'1 89 Due to this power, Western authorities have put pres-
sure on Mbeki to use his clout to influence Mugabe's agenda.
In 2003, President Bush expressed initial confidence in Mbeki's
efforts of quiet diplomacy with Zimbabwe, saying: "[H]e 'is the point
man on the subject. He is working very hard. He believes that he is
making good progress."' 190 This supposed progress never materialized
as the situation continued to deteriorate over the next two years. After
the commencement of Operation Murambatsvina, Western leaders
upped the ante, calling for a strong stance from Mbeki on Zimbabwe's
policies. 191 Subsequently, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
met with Mbeki and apparently urged a stronger stance be taken
against Zimbabwe. 192 British Foreign Secretary Straw urged regional
African leaders, particularly South Africa, to put pressure on Mugabe
to reign in his worst excesses. 193 However, one commentator offered
the following assessment of Mbeki's reticence in dealing with Zim-
babwe despite Western pressures:
The fact is that Mbeki finds Zimbabwe's plight politically useful in
dealing with his most restive constituencies at home. The fate of
Zimbabwe's white farmers and business owners is constantly dan-
188. South Africa recently became one of four countries in the world to legal-
ize gay marriage. See South Africa's high court approves gay marriage,
MSNBC.com, Dec. 1, 2005, http:/www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10279366/.
189. Levine, supra note 187.
190. Joshua Frydenberg, Hell in World Basket Case, THE COURIER MAIL,
(Queensland) Sept. 26, 2005, at 11.
191. "Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer told parliament that Aus-
tralia will continue to ratchet up pressure on countries like South Africa to 'stand up
to' President Mugabe in light of his refusal to accept assistance for four million peo-
ple in need of food and thousands made homeless by Operation Murambatsvina."
Zimbabwe Press Review for 5 November, BBC MONITORING, Nov. 5, 2005.
192. Mbeki appears to have responded; purportedly abandoning quiet diplo-
macy but has yet to make any definitive steps towards changing South Africa's poli-
cies. Roger Bate, The Sadness of Zimbabwe, ZIMB. INDEP., Oct. 28, 2005.
193. Katherine Haddon, Straw Urges Action by Neighbor States on Zimbabwe,
PRESs Ass'N (London), Nov. 1, 2005.
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gled before South Africa's racial minorities as a warning of what
could happen if they don't play along. To South Africa's massive,
sometimes unruly population of urban poor, Mbeki uses Zim-
babwe's economic collapse to teach a lesson: if you demand pro-
gress too quickly, you get hyperinflation, debt and ruin. 
194
Mugabe, though, has reached out to South Africa. Zimbabwe was
in arrears with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and facing ex-
pulsion.195 A loan from South Africa was discussed; but, when South
Africa attempted to condition the loan with humanitarian terms, con-
versation stalled. 96 Zimbabwe and South African officials continued
to discuss the possibility of a loan into September 2005, even after
Zimbabwe managed to make an initial payment towards its arrears
with the IMF. 197 The source of Zimbabwe's initial $131 million pay-
ment to the IMF sparked speculation.' 98 In the face of suggestions that
South Africa covertly assisted Zimbabwe with its payment to the IMF,
South Africa's Finance Minister soundly rejected this hypothesis. 99
"[S]ome economists have said that it was possible for Zimbabwe to
have raised the $120m by putting pressure on private businesses to
grant loans to the country's central bank and by not fully allocating
194. Leon, supra note 183.
195. The IMF has not expelled a country since Czechoslovakia in 1954. IMF
Postpones Expulsion, FACTS ON FILE WORLD DIGEST, Oct. 27, 2005, at 766C3. The
World Bank also stated they will withhold funding from Zimbabwe due to concerns
over corruption and to set an example. However, the World Bank has already ceased
funding Zimbabwe due to its being in arrears and limits its participation to analytical
work, policy support and humanitarian and social support. Thea Fourie, World Bank
President Expresses Concern over Financing Zimbabwe, WORLD MARKETS
ANALYSIS, Oct. 12, 2005.
196. Mbeki turned the tables on Mugabe and stressed solidarity and past politi-
cal debts owed to him to lessen the impact of a conditional loan offer. South Africa
demanded that the forced evictions cease and that Mugabe meet with MDC leaders.
Mbeki Indicates He May Pay Off Mugabe's IMF Debt, supra note 17.
197. The IMF delayed expelling Zimbabwe for six months upon receipt of this
initial payment. IMF Postpones Expulsion, supra note 195.
198. An IMF official stated they had queried the source of the funding. Zim-
babwe states the money derived from banks in New York, London, export proceeds,
free funds, and foreign currency liquidations. Bailout Talks to Resume Soon, U.N.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Sept. 28, 2005.
199. Jonathan Katzenellenbogen 'Rubbish' to Say SA Bailed Out Zimbabwe,
Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Sept. 29, 2005.
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foreign exchange at its weekly auctions.,,200 Zimbabwe bought itself
time from imminent bankruptcy, but its economic future remains more
than shaky. 2
0 1
It is in South Africa's interest that Zimbabwe not collapse next
door, as South Africa would inherit Zimbabwe's refugees and other
social concerns. For example, as Norman Levine comments:
The relative prosperity of South Africa has prompted a flood of le-
gal and illegal immigrations from the nation's African neighbors.
Unemployment is still high in South Africa, so the new immigrants
frequently turn into the urban poor, but politically, it is impossible
for majority-black South Africa to block the immigration of other
black Africans. 202
Zimbabwe's economic crisis has already seen a flood of Zimbabweans
illegally crossing the border into South Africa. "According to the Ge-
neva-based International Organisation for Migration, at least 2,000
Zimbabweans are deported from South Africa via the border town of
Beitbridge every week. '20 3 South Africa must also concern itself with
issues beyond immigration. "Having a failed state on one's borders
also raises the risk of a surge in unsavoury activities like money laun-
dering, terrorism and crime-all of which carry an economic and so-
cial CoSt. ' 204 Alternatively, Zimbabwe's downward slide has not yet
caused significant damage to South Africa's fortunes.
[T]hough Zimbabwe may have played a role in the rand's collapse
in 2001, South Africa has subsequently distanced itself from Zim-
babwe in terms of its approach to economic management, land re-
form and black empowerment .... If anything, Zimbabwe's trou-
200. Id.
201. "Zimbabwe is the world's fastest shrinking economy, having shed 40% of
its real GDP since 1997. The IMF nevertheless warns that Zimbabwe continues to
cast a cloud over the region that unnerves some foreign investors." Claire Bisseker,
Zimbabwe's Impact on SA's Economy, FIN. MAIL (S. Aft.), Oct. 21, 2005, at 34.
202. Levine, supra note 187, at A17. "If the economy were to implode, then
the steady stream of 1000 Zimbabwean refugees that pour into SA daily could be-
come a flood, adding to the stresses on SA, which already has a broad unemploy-
ment rate of 40%." Bisseker, supra note 201.
203. Bailout Talks to Resume Soon, supra note 198.
204. Bisseker, supra note 201.
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bles have diverted tourists to South Africa. This includes interna-
tional tourists to Victoria Falls who afterwards choose to spend
time in South Africa rather than Zimbabwe. 205
Although Mbeki took a harder stance in statements about Mug-
abe's policies, he did not accede to international pressure to fully cen-
sure his northern neighbor.20 6 The relationship between these
neighboring countries is complex and layered and commands the at-
tention of all of Africa, not merely the region, who watched the inter-
play between Zimbabwe and the West with fervent attention. 20 7 "Why
can't these Westerners understand that the more they shout about
Mugabe the stronger such leaders become and the more difficult it is
for an African leader to condemn him openly for fear of being seen as
a Western puppet? 20 8 Former South African President De Klerk
summed up the complexities of South Africa's political ties with Zim-
babwe:
[T]hey are being hammered across the world [for] the Zimbabwe
situation .... What should we do? Isn't the world expecting too
much from us vis-A-vis Zimbabwe? Should we send in our army?
Should we make Zimbabwe South Africa's Iraq? I don't think so,
because if we really put on a scale the worst countries in Africa, ter-
ribly bad as it is, Zimbabwe isn't the worst. Should we strangle
them economically? ... We will just make the people who are al-
ready hungry die of hunger. We won't hurt Mugabe and his cro-
nies.
209
205. Id.
206. Mbeki recently met with opposition leaders from the MDC in Johannes-
burg in an attempt to try to foster a dialogue, raising the ire of Zimbabwe officials.
"[W]hen President Mbeki tries to save or prop up an opposition party that was
formed to dislodge another Africa president, then surely such and many other ques-
tions will be asked." The SA, Nigeria And MDC Connection, THE HERALD (Zimb.),
Nov. 6, 2005.
207. "[M]ost of these African leaders seem to fear him. Some of them marvel
at how he has managed to take on the West. They actually admire him and he is tak-
ing advantage of that." Tendai Farai, Zimbabwe on the Brink; Heart of Darkness,
THE ADVERTISER, July 16, 2005, at W07.
208. Abdul-Raheem, supra note 19.
209. Richard Stengel, Council on Foreign Relations HBO History Makers Se-
ries with Frederick Willem De Klerk, Former President of South Africa, FED. NEWS
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B. China
In recent years, disgruntled with Western efforts to curtail human
rights violations through targeted sanctions, Mugabe's government
vigorously pursued a "Look East" policy.21 China is looking at in-
vestment opportunities in Zimbabwe, courting the industrial markets
for raw resources, developing markets for its own goods, and boosting
the tourist market to improve the value of its investments.2 1 Mugabe
reportedly sought a loan from China to fund its IMF bailout; however,
leery of international scrutiny, China only provided a lukewarm re-
sponse and tepid promises. 21 2 Perhaps Mugabe's strongest weapon in
his relationship with China is its position as one of the five permanent
U.N. Security Council members, providing veto power to any resolu-
tions targeting Zimbabwe. China made clear that it would exercise this
veto.213 In the face of China's own human rights record, it is unlikely
that it will be swayed to utilize its economic power to influence Mug-
abe. However, Mugabe's own policies appear to be China's greatest
SERVICE, June 8, 2004.
210. "Europe, America and Africa remain Zimbabwe's major trading partners
despite government's Look East thrust, latest figures from the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe reveal .... [T]he numbers indicate that there is very little business going
on between Zimbabwe and Asian countries which are the major focus of the policy."
Shakeman Mugari, West Still Major Trading Partner Despite Look East Policy,
ZIMB. INDEP., Sept. 23, 2005.
211. China is expanding its commercial reach in Zimbabwe, including tourism,
industry, minerals excavation, funding broadcasting equipment, credit lines to pur-
chase electricity services, a donation of a commuter plane to the national airline, and
most predominantly, agriculture development. Zimbabwe to Participate at Travel
Showcases in China, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE (China), Nov. 5, 2005; IDC
Seeks US$7m to Reopen Zimglass Furnace, THE HERALD (Zimb.), Nov. 8, 2005;
China to Supply Transmitters to State Broadcaster, BBC MONITORING INT'L
REPORTS, Oct. 27, 2005; Thea Fourie, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority Se-
cures Credit Facility from China, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Oct. 19, 2005; Do-
nated Plane to Zimbabwe by China Expected Next Year, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE (China), Oct. 6, 2005; Chinese Firm Pledges to Back Agrarian Reform,
THE HERALD (Zimb.), Sept. 19, 2005.
212. "In all, China has spent only US $100 million on Zimbabwe despite Mug-
abe's hype about cementing Sino-Zimbabwean relations." Mbeki Indicates He May
Pay Off Mugabe 's IMF Debt, supra note 17.
213. China, Tanzania Thwart Efforts to Put Zimbabwe Report on UN Agenda,
(ZTV1, Harare, television broadcast July 26, 2005) (text of report on file with the
California Western International Law Journal).
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deterrent, creating an atmosphere that is causing it to hesitate. Even
China will not sanction investing in a country whose economy is spi-
raling out of control.
China and Zimbabwe share ties dating back to the liberation
struggle, when China was a chief ally of ZANJ-PF and the minority
rule movement.214 As the West pushed harder at Mugabe and made ef-
forts to reign in his policies, Mugabe wooed China as a source of fi-
nancial and political support.215 Western superpowers are unhappy
with this new direction, which both the United States and United
Kingdom made clear to China.2 16
China is increasingly, because of its economic weight and its pres-
ence on the Security Council, a key player in challenges that the in-
ternational community faces around the world ... and our view is
we should have a dialogue with China that's strategic about what
that role should be because many people question, for example,
why the leader of Zimbabwe or other leaders who are not moving in
the direction the international community is calling for, have such
access to Beijing. 217
There is a philosophical difference between the East and West in
how to approach international humanitarian crises.218 China believes
214. Zimbabwe, China Continue to Strengthen Cooperation, XINHUA GENERAL
NEWS SERVICE (China), Sept. 29, 2005.
215. "Government has given a number of farms seized from white commercial
farmers during the land reform programme to the Chinese as incentives for them to
start business ventures in Zimbabwe." Chinese Get Seized Farms as Incentive to In-
vest, ZIMB. INDEP., Nov. 11, 2005. Further, Zimbabwe and China have signed agree-
ments regarding the exchange of pesticide production and management. The agree-
ment paves the way for an increase in agro trade between the two nations. Zim,
China Sign Agreement, THE HERALD (Zimb.), Nov. 12, 2005.
216. Britain approached China to request it respect the travel bans imposed on
Zimbabwean government officials by Britain, Australia and the United States. Min-
ister Praises China for Loyalty in Face of 'Detractors', (ZTVl Harare television
broadcast, BBC MONITORING INT'L REPORTS Sept. 26, 2005).
217. Background Briefing, Wash. Foreign Press Center, The President's Up-
coming Trip to Asia (Nov. 11, 2005) (on file with the California Western Interna-
tional Law Journal).
218. Ian Brenmner states:
Since Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has been shaped by the convic-
tion that Washington must push for political reform in some authoritarian
regimes and isolate others to prevent them from incubating terrorism and
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that it is promoting the interests of African citizens in a manner that
benefits all involved and that many initiatives are directly in line with
Western policies. 219 However it is clear that China intends to pursue a
policy of non-intervention, in particularly with regards to Zimbabwe.
When questioned about Western concerns regarding China's relation-
ship with African hotspots, Chinese Ambassador to South Africa Liu
Guijin responded:
We have our own approach to doing things and that is something
like the South African government's quiet diplomacy. We do not,
like western countries, have a habit of interfering in other countries'
internal affairs and there is no example of us imposing our ideology
on Africa nowadays .... From our own bitter experience, China
favours negotiation, talking and does not resort to sanctions and
embargoes. 
220
obtaining weapons of mass destruction. The Chinese, on the other hand,
formulate policies meant to fuel their fast-growing economy and maintain
social stability. The Communist Party leadership believes it must continue
to create jobs at a steady pace, satisfy rising consumer expectations, and
lift hundreds of millions of peasants out of poverty in order to prevent the
social unrest provoked by uneven economic development. To ensure that
happens, Beijing is doing more and more business with regimes Washing-
ton wants to democratize or isolate.
Ian Bremmer, Why Bush and Hu Don't See Eye to Eye, FORTUNE INT'L, Oct. 31,
2005, at 37.
219. Indeed,
China and African countries share mutual understanding and support as
they step up consultation and cooperation. China actively pushes the inter-
national community to give priority to the peace and development of Af-
rica. It insists that reform of the United Nations should give priority to in-
creasing the representation of African countries and other developing
countries in the Security Council. In addition, China is carrying out its
promise to waive $1.3bn US dollars of debt on 31 African countries and
reduce imports tariffs on 25 least developed African countries while never
attaching any political conditions to its aid packages.
Senior Chinese Leaders Plan Simultaneous Visits to Africa in November, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY (Beijing), Nov. 10, 2005.
220. Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, The Official Line-China, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.)
Nov. 7, 2005.
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When asked whether China was prepared to overlook human
rights violations and bad governance to secure good relations with an
African government, he replied:
We do recognise the universality of human rights. But equally hu-
man rights are not simply about allowing people to speak freely and
to demonstrate. The other side of human rights is the right of devel-
opment, the right to survival. The kind of democracy and human
rights are basically the choice of the people and of the state. That
does not mean China maintains that everything that sovereign gov-
ernments do are [sic] correct or totally in accordance with the basic
spirit of human rights. But we don't want to interference [sic] in
countries' internal affairs. 221
It is not clear whether China is only taking moderate steps toward
investing in Zimbabwe's economic future due to the influence of
Western condemnation or hesitancy based on the shaky structure of
Zimbabwe's finances. But it appears evident that China will continue
to block any attempts at Security Council intervention and will not
speak out against Mugabe for such policies as Operation Murambats-
vina.
VI. CiVIL SOCIETY
In recent years "[Zimbabwe] ordered the closure of a number of
NGO's and banned others from operating in the country after accusing
them of acting as fronts and conduits for Western governments and
the main opposition [party]. 222 In 2004, a bill was drafted, passing
through the Zimbabwean Parliament, with the potential to severely
hamper future efforts of civil society in Zimbabwe. 223 Spawned by a
belief that agencies are dictated by Western policies that promote ide-
als to foster a regime change, the bill prohibits local NGO's involved
221. Id.
222. Zimbabwe: NGO's to Discuss Restrictions with Govt, U.N. INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 4, 2005.
223. Human Rights Watch, Zimbabwe's Non-Governmental Organizations
Bill: Out of Sync with SADC Standards and a Threat to Civil Society Groups (2004),
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe/2004/12/. Mugabe purportedly vetoed
the bill; however, it is being applied in practice. NGO's to Discuss Restrictions with
Govt, supra note 222.
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in "issues of governance" to receive foreign funding. 224 Additionally,
foreign NGO's engaged in "issues of governance" are prohibited from
registering to operate within Zimbabwe. 225 "'Issues of governance' are
defined by the Bill to include 'the promotion and protection of human
rights and political governance issues."'
226
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the South Afri-
can Council of Churches all publicly condemned Operation Muram-
batsvina.227 However, relief efforts were stymied by legislation and
practice policies of Zimbabwe. 228 "Mugabe lashed out at NGO's,
whom he accused of going on the war path against Operation Garikai
as it sought to provide people with decent accommodation and ser-
vices through elimination of squalor whose images had become a
powerful medium for NGO fund-raising efforts." 229 As a result, trucks
carrying relief goods stalled in ports in South Africa, trucks were
turned back at borders, and food stores rotted in warehouses because
224. Zimbabwe's Non-Governmental Organizations Bill, supra note 223.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The Catholic Church also expressed "grave concern" over the growing
humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, which seemed to have little effect, despite Mug-
abe's avowals of being a devout Catholic. Ray Matikinye, Bishops Meeting to Blast
Mugabe Over Clean-Up, ZIMB. STANDARD, July 3, 2005. High-ranking clerics
within the church also called upon "Zimbabwe's neighbors to do more to stop the
violence that has accompanied the evictions." Id.
228. "Although the [United Nations] was able to move freely about the coun-
try, access to evicted people had been difficult, particularly for NGO's. [A]id agen-
cies had not been informed when evictions took place, and often arrived too late, or
on occasion were not allowed to access sites where evictions had taken place." Zim-
babwe: Gov't Won't Agree on Appeal for Victim Cleanup, U.N. INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 29, 2005. "[F]or the first three weeks of the cam-
paign, aid organizations were forcibly prevented from assisting those left to live in
the open at the onset of winter, without food, their belongings piled up on the road-
side beside them." Corcoran, supra note 128. Since the evictions, UNICEF, the U.N.
World Food Programme, the International Office of Migration, the Zimbabwe Red
Cross Society and local NGO's have been able to provide blankets and plastic sheet-
ing for the displaced, along with sanitation facilities, food and shelter. Additionally,
UNICEF has rented housing for 100 families with disabled children. UNICEF Rents
Housing for Evicted Zimbabweans With Disabilities, UN NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 10,
2005.
229. China, Tanzania Thwart Efforts to Put Zimbabwe on UN Agenda, supra
note 142.
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agencies were not allowed to access needy populations.2 30 The only
recourse open to agencies was to broadcast conditions and draw atten-
tion to the human rights violations of the Mugabe regime, which ef-
fectively shut out assistance with its isolationist policies, in essence
becoming the North Korea of Africa.a3'
Despite Zimbabwe's renunciation of the West, the United King-
dom and United States have been major donors of relief to the region.
In response to a United Nation request for relief assistance to the re-
gion, the United States announced in August 2006 a relief package of
$51.8 million to Southern Africa, most of which will be diverted to
Zimbabwe.2 32 Further, "the U.S. has provided $300 million in food as-
sistance to Zimbabwe since 2002. "233 In a simultaneous response, the
United Kingdom pledged 11.5 million GBP in humanitarian assistance
with 10 million earmarked for Zimbabwe. 234 The aid money will be
channeled through U.N. agencies and NGO's. However, this is pre-
cisely the conundrum that Mugabe faces with accepting Western
sources of aid. When Mugabe met with Annan in New York in Sep-
230. Visiting U.S. Ambassador Hall noted, "several tonnes of relief food were
being held up by bureaucratic paperwork." Envoy Avoids Mugabe, ZIMB.
STANDARD, Aug. 14, 2005. Further, the South Africa Council of Churches, after an
initial fact finding mission, launched "Operation Hope for Zimbabwe" in response to
Operation Murambatsvina. S. Africa Council of Churches to Ship 1 August Relief
Aid to Zimbabwe's Homeless, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., July 29, 2005. How-
ever, Zimbabwe thwarted their efforts and refused to allow trucks carrying relief
goods to enter the country. Good Samaritans Become Targets, FIN. GAZETTE
(Zimb.), Aug. 18, 2005. The Herald reported that the SACC visit was "bankrolled by
British intelligence services" and part of a campaign to push for regime change.
South African Churchmen Back in Zimbabwe, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 19, 2005. The
trucks were eventually allowed to enter Zimbabwe after proof was furnished that the
maize was not genetically modified. Church Aid to Leave for Harare Soon, UN
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 11, 2005.
231. Paul Salopek, On Road to Economic Meltdown; Insular Zimbabwe is Fast
Becoming Africa's North Korea, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2005, at C3.
232. Envoy Avoids Mugabe, supra note 230.
233. Id.
234. The United Kingdom's total humanitarian commitments made to Zim-
babwe since the ongoing crisis started in 2001 is now over $100 million. Thea Fou-
rie, U.K. Extends Aid to Zimbabwe, WORLD MRT. ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 2005. Addi-
tionally, South Africa pledged $22 million to the World Food Programme after the
United Nations warned of continuing droughts in the South African region. SA to
Donate $22m to Ease Food Shortages, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.) Oct. 10, 2005.
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tember 2005 at the World Summit, Annan again stressed the need for
Zimbabwe to accept U.N. food provisions.235 Mugabe continued to
object to the use of NGO's as a conduit of delivery "because these
tended to politicize humanitarian assistance. What we do not want is
for the United Nations to give a role to non-governmental organiza-
tions so these NGO's make politics out of it."' 236 An article recently
published in New African magazine, details the thinking process be-
hind Mugabe's civil society paranoia:237
In Zimbabwe, whose government is intensely disliked by Western
powers, NGO's are known not to give aid to vulnerable groups
unless they are allowed to distribute it themselves, in so doing pass-
ing on their "message." African governments are left with two op-
tions: accept the aid and subsequent undermining of their institu-
tions, or refuse the aid to the immediate cost of the population
affected, and the simultaneous negative impact from the adverse
lobbying by the NGO's, with support from their respective gov-
ernments. Therefore, recipient countries now have the enormous
challenge of maintaining their basic sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity.
2 38
Due to these institutional difficulties the role of civil society in
helping Zimbabwe address its problems has come under increasing
scrutiny. One Zimbabwean activist commented that Operation Mu-
rambatsvina "may have served as a turning point for non-
governmental organizations." 239 He also noted that "[t]he struggle in
235. See Annan Visit Still On, THE HERALD (Zimb.), Sept. 19, 2005. "Mugabe,
quite implausibly, claims to have an iron grasp of the problems at hand. His people,
he declared at the UN in September, are 'very, very happy.' If there's not enough
maize, he said, in a Monty Python-meets-Marie Antoinette moment, 'we have heaps
of potatoes."' Leon, supra note 183. "A bag of potatoes costs about £20 and is out of
reach of many Zimbabweans." Basildon Peta, Mugabe's Regime Admits Zimbabwe's
People are Starving, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Oct. 6, 2005. "Zimbabweans are not
hungry, he said-they just can't eat their favorite foods." Mugabe's Colonial
Ghosts, THE INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2005, at 6.
236. Annan Visit Still On, supra note 235.
237. New African is published by a Mugabe supporter. Murambatsvina CIO
Brainchild, FIN. GAZETTE (Zimb.), Oct. 6, 2005.
238. Michael Onyanyo, NGOs: Pseudo Governments or Surrogates of Western
Powers?, NEW AFR., Aug. 1, 2005, at 20.
239. Nduru, supra note 99.
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Zimbabwe is between its people and their government. This makes it
difficult for the people who don't have resources, access to the media
and transport to push for change. This is why we need support from
our African brothers and sisters., 240 However, the equal resistance the
Zimbabwean government exerted against civil society led to a stale-
mate.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink promote a boomerang pat-
tern to describe the effects of transnational advocacy networks to
change societal patterns.24' When the government of a state is the hu-
man rights violator, internal actors are usually stymied in their abili-
ties to effectuate change. Domestic NGO's seek out international al-
lies to bring pressure to bear on the state from the outside. For the
domestic actor, these connections provide access, leverage, informa-
tion, and money; while for international agencies they provide evi-
dence that effort is being made to advance rights within troubled na-
tions. It is clear that Mugabe is doing everything possible to hinder the
efforts of domestic actors, as well as the efforts of these agencies to
seek out international actors. An opportunity was missed to utilize the
GPID through the Special Envoy to initiate the boomerang process in
Zimbabwe. It has been pointed out that
[soft law] can serve as the fulcrum of this process as well, or nearly
as well, as more traditional ... [hard law]. Advocates hope that pri-
vately generated [soft law] like the GPID will enmesh governments
in a web of norms and pressures from above (other states and [in-
ternational organizations]) and below (civil society).242
VII. CONCLUSION
In September 2005, Mugabe was named the fourth worst dictator
in the world in a survey compiled by dictator-watcher David
Wallechinsky in collaboration with Amnesty International, Freedom
240. Id. "On June 23, a coalition of more than 200 African and international
NGO's issued an unprecedented joint appeal to the United Nations and the African
Union for intervention to help Zimbabweans whose houses were demolished." Id.
241. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS
12-13 (1998).
242. Kenneth Abbott, Privately Generated Soft Law in International Govern-
ance: Comment on Francis M. Deng (on file with author).
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House, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters Without Borders.243 De-
spite suggestions that Mugabe be forcibly removed from office,
[t]he absurdity of this stance is obvious .... [I]n spite of all the vili-
fication and demonisation by the most powerful global media, the
President still commands the respect of more than half the world,
including those who do not entirely agree with him and his meth-
ods. This is the major reason why, when it comes to the highest
councils in Europe and at the United Nations, there has never been
any unanimous agreement that the President and his country be to-
tally condemned.244
This is true to some extent, and is reflected in the ambivalence of re-
gional states, the South African Development Commission, and Afri-
can Union towards forcing Mugabe to policy change. However, it
likely also reflects a concern about causing more harm to the Zim-
babwean populace through any collective security or sanction action.
One commentator offered this perspective:
The problem is with Mugabe. He knows as soon as he is out of
power he will be prosecuted. He has created too many enemies
within ZANU PF and outside. Maybe what the people of Zimbabwe
need to understand is that Mugabe is afraid to leave office. If the
people of Zimbabwe address that, then maybe we can find a solu-
tion. 24
5
This is an interesting idea, offering Mugabe blanket amnesty in ex-
change for abdicating power.246 What is likely to be more effective,
but hampered by Mugabe's civil society policies and sadly, the failure
of the United Nations to apply the GPID, is a mobilization effort from
243. Those edging him out for top honors are Kim Jong I1 of North Korea at
number one, Than Shwe of Burma at number two and Hu Jintao of China at number
three, ironically Mugabe's vested partner. Daniel Boffey, The Worlds Worst Dicta-
tors, THE MIRROR, Sept. 1, 2004, at 6.
244. We Need Development Based on Local Resources, THE HERALD (Zimb),
Oct. 9, 2005.
245. Cosanna Preston, Zimbabwe: A Polarized Society, CAN. DIMENSION, July
1, 2005, at 22.
246. This worked with Pinochet, but likely sets a poor example as Chile is now
forcing his return to face prosecution for his human rights violations while in office.
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within.247 Further hampering the effort is the significant brain drain
Zimbabwe has experienced in recent years; educated professionals
immigrating to other countries and leaving a gaping hole of qualified
professionals in the workforce.248 Finally, the MDC, once a strong op-
position voice, is falling apart. Quarrels over internal policy are splin-
tering the group and Mugabe's efforts to dispel enclaves of MDC sup-
ports via Operation Murambatsvina were all too successful. 249
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement are promising
documents that address the concerns of those affected by internal dis-
placement. Further, the Principles are gaining international acceptance
and momentum towards achieving status as a standard applicable to
state and non-state actors who initiate displacement crisis. However, a
valuable opportunity was lost to dramatically advance the Guiding
Principles by enumerating the violations by Zimbabwe in the Special
Envoy report and failing to send a representative who would appropri-
ately apply them in this circumstance. As a result, the Principles linger
in the limbo of lip service by the United Nations rather than calling
violators to task. It is also clear that other state actors and NGO's are
hampered to intervene during internal displacement crises. Zimbabwe
247. Corcoran states:
Change for Zimbabweans must be wrought from within, either by an op-
position group or by disgruntled members of the ruling party. If interna-
tional aid is denied to the masses, leaders with the courage to instigate
such a change have a much better chance of success if they can rally citi-
zens that have absolutely nothing to lose except the starvation and poverty
forced upon them by their own government.
Corcoran, supra note 128.
248. It is estimated more than 500,000 individuals with higher education have
left Zimbabwe. Brain Drain Economic, Not Political, THE HERALD (Zimb.), Oct. 11,
2005.
249. Dumisani Muleya, Tsvangirai Leader Snubs President Mbeki as MDC
Factions Battle, Bus. DAY, Oct. 25, 2005. "Ninety-five per cent of people are fed up
with Mugabe but they don't know what to do. They have no real leader to motivate
them and are frightened that Mugabe will turn the army on them." Christina Lamb,
Quiet Chant of 'Hungry, Hungry' Rouses a Nation to Oust Mugabe, SUNDAY TIMES
(London) Mar. 27, 2005, at 20. "A recent survey found that only 14 per cent of black
South Africans approve of him. Ordinary Zimbabweans... are, privately, Mugabe's
most embittered critics. Mugabe's real constituents are not the African 'masses' he
claims to represent, but the crusty southern African post-colonial elites. Mugabe's
anti-Western histrionics appeal to their lingering insecurity, resentment and Soviet
nostalgia." Leon, supra note 183.
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and its allies effectively hindered efforts to call the state to task before
the international community. It is vital in going forward that the
United Nations appropriately utilizes the document that was so labori-
ously created. In doing so, internally displaced persons may some day
receive the recognition and protections afforded refugees, their fellow
brethren in the loss and confusion of having no home within their
homeland.
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APPENDIX
Principle Language Action in Violation
Principle 1. National authorities have the Depending on their location, the
3 primary duty and responsibility population affected by the evictions
to provide protection and hu- is in immediate need of tents, blan-
manitarian assistance to inter- kets, food, water, sanitation and
nally displaced persons within medical assistance.
their jurisdiction. Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 36.
2. Internally displaced persons
have the right to request and to
receive protection and humani-
tarian assistance from these au-
thorities. They shall not be per-
secuted or punished for making
such a request.
Principle 2. Certain internally displaced The impact is particularly severe for
4 persons, such as children, espe- vulnerable groups such as orphans,
cially unaccompanied minors, widows, pregnant women, women
expectant mothers, mothers with and child-headed households, the
young children, female heads of chronically ill, the elderly and the
household, persons with disabili- disabled.
ties and elderly persons, shall be Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 34.
entitled to protection and assis- A 19-year old woman from Chi-
tance required by their condition tungwiza in Harare told the mis-
and to treatment which takes into sion: "I was living in a cottage with
account their special needs. my younger sister and my disabled
brother. My parents had already
passed away. Then the clean-up op-
eration came and destroyed the cot-
tage. Now we have nowhere to go
and we are sleeping outside. Our
blankets and our other property
were stolen. We are not going to
school because we have no place to
stay. We are sleeping outside with
my disabled brother in a cold
place."
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 37.
Principle All authorities and international The Government of Zimbabwe has
5 actors shall respect and ensure a duty to protect and enforce the
respect for their obligations un- economic and social rights of its
der international law, including citizens as guaranteed by the Con-
human rights and humanitarian stitution of Zimbabwe and the Afri-
law, in all circumstances, so as can Charter on Human and Peoples'
to prevent and avoid conditions Rights. The Government of Zim-
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that might lead to displacement
of persons.
1. Every human being shall have
the right to be protected against
being arbitrarily displaced from
his or her home or place of ha-
bitual residence.
(c) In cases of large-scale devel-
opment projects, which are not
Principle
6
babwe also has a duty to fulfil its
obligations under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which Zimbabwe
ratified on 13th May 1991. General
Comment Numbers 4... and Num-
ber 7 . . . of the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights state that,
"forced evictions are prima facie
incompatible with the provisions of
the Covenant and can only be car-
ried out under specific circum-
stances." As a member of the
United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, Zimbabwe commit-
ted itself to advocating for the re-
spect and implementation of key
Resolutions on Forced Evictions
passed in 1993... 1998... and
2004....
The foremost statement of interna-
tional law relating to housing rights
is found in the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights which states in Article
11(1) that: "The State parties to the
present Covenant recognise the
right of every one to an adequate
standard of living for himself [her-
self] and his [her] family, including
adequate food, clothing and hous-
ing, and to the continuous im-
provement of living conditions. The
States parties will take appropriate
steps to ensure the realisation of this
right, recognising to this effect the
essential importance to international
cooperation based on free consent."
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 57.
Official Government figures re-
leased on 7 July 2005 revealed a
total of 92,460 housing structures
that had been demolished directly
affecting 133,534 households. At
the same time, the structures of
32,538 small, micro and medium-
51
Hager: Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors Fai
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
272 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
justified by compelling and size enterprises were demolished.
overriding public interests; Based on average household size
derived from the 2002 census, and
authoritative studies on the informal
economy, the population having
lost their homes can be estimated at
569,685, and those having lost their
primary source of livelihood at
97,614.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 32.
Principle
7
In summary, Operation Garikai
gives the impression of being hast-
ily put together. It does not appear
to have accounted for the immedi-
ate shelter needs of people who
have been rendered homeless at the
onset of winter. The mission was
able to witness thousands of people,
including small children, pregnant
women and the elderly, who were
sleeping in the open without ade-
quate protection from the elements
either on the rubble of their de-
stroyed homes, in rural areas or in
official transit camps. The mission
visited one of the transit camps
known as Caledonia Farm on the
outskirts of Harare where an esti-
mated 5,000 people were being sus-
tained by ad hoc humanitarian as-
sistance at the time of the visit.
While this camp is intended to be a
temporary facility pending reloca-
tion to other destinations, it was
evident that Government capacity to
provide basic needs and sustenance
is severely limited. The conditions
of those living in the camp clearly
did not meet SPHERE standards
and are worse than those found in
refugee camps.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 49.
1. Prior to any decision requiring
the displacement of persons, the
authorities concerned shall en-
sure that all feasible alternatives
are explored in order to avoid
displacement altogether. Where
no alternatives exist, all meas-
ures shall be taken to minimize
displacement and its adverse ef-
fects.
2. The authorities undertaking
such displacement shall ensure,
to the greatest practicable extent,
that proper accommodation is
provided to the displaced per-
sons, that such displacements are
effected in satisfactory condi-
tions of safety, nutrition, health
and hygiene, and that members
of the same family are not sepa-
rated.
(a) A specific decision shall be
taken by a State authority em-
powered by law to order such
measures;
(b) Adequate measures shall be
taken to guarantee to those to be
displaced full information on the
reasons and procedures for their
displacement and, where appli-
cable, on compensation and re-
location;
(c) The free and informed con-
sent of those to be displaced
shall be sought;
(d) The authorities concerned
shall endeavour to involve those
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affected, particularly women, in
the planning and management of
their relocation;
2. To give effect to this right for
internally displaced persons,
they shall not be interned in or
confined to a camp. If in excep-
tional circumstances such in-
ternment or confinement is abso-
lutely necessary, it shall not last
longer than required by the cir-
cumstances.
+ .1
1. Every internally displaced
person has the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to
choose his or her residence.
Principle
12
Principle
14
People who have moved to transit
points/camps. At the time of the
mission, the main such camp was
Caledonia Farm near Harare, which
held about 5,000 persons. Another
camp located in the Sports Oval of
Mutare held about 100 persons,
while an additional camp was
planned in Bulawayo.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 34.
Government officials repeatedly as-
serted in the press and in official
statements to the mission that a ma-
jor expected outcome of Operation
Restore Order is the "return" of
people to rural areas. It is the in-
formed opinion of the mission,
based on two decades of research
by UN-HABITAT and its partners,
that this is a misinformed assump-
tion. Rural-urban migration is
driven by economic factors. It lies
in the search for better livelihoods
and escaping rural poverty. More-
over, urban to rural relocation,
whether forced or voluntary, would
exacerbate the present situation in
rural Zimbabwe, characterized by
several years of continuous drought,
shortages in food supply and falling
incomes.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 35.
Those affected include tens of thou-
sands of people of Malawian, Mo-
zambican and Zambian origin who
have established themselves for
decades, and in some cases for gen-
erations, in Zimbabwe. They have
no rural home to go to. Similarly,
many widows and divorcees have
no rural homes to return to, because
property often stays with the former
husband's side of the family. Others
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are in need of medical care which is
difficult to get in rural areas. The
mission was also presented with
testimonials of families transported
to rural areas had been rejected by
traditional leaders who claimed that
they did not want to be exposed to
"the immorality of urban lifestyles
and increased risks of HIV propaga-
tion."
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 35.
1. All internally displaced per-
sons have the right to an ade-
quate standard of living.
2. At the minimum, regardless of
the circumstances, and without
discrimination, competent au-
thorities shall provide internally
displaced persons with and en-
sure safe access to:
(a) Essential food and potable
water;
(b) Basic shelter and housing;
(c) Appropriate clothing; and
(d) Essential medical services
and sanitation.
3. Special efforts should be
made to ensure the full participa-
tion of women in the planning
and distribution of these basic
supplies.
1. All wounded and sick inter-
nally displaced persons as well
as those with disabilities shall
receive to the fullest extent prac-
ticable and with the least possi-
ble delay, the medical care and
attention they require, without
distinction on any grounds other
than medical ones. When neces-
sary, internally displaced per-
sons shall have access to psycho-
logical and social services.
3. Special attention should also
be given to the prevention of
contagious and infectious dis-
Many of the displaced are staying in
overcrowded conditions or out in
the open without adequate access to
water and sanitation. Unless their
situation is improved, there is a se-
rious risk of transmission of disease
and of epidemic outbreaks related
to water-borne diseases such as di-
arrhea, dysentery and cholera. This
threat is exacerbated by the lack of
access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation. Many displaced
persons were observed to be col-
lecting drinking water from rivers,
streams and unprotected shallow
wells while using open areas for
sanitation. The risk of an epidemic
is likely to increase dramatically
with the start of the rainy season
towards October- November.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 37-38.
An estimated 24.6% of adult Zim-
babweans are infected with
HIV/AIDS. Assuming that the dis-
placed population had an
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate similar
to the rest of population, the mis-
sion estimates that over 79,500 per-
sons over 15 years of age living
with HIV/AIDS have been dis-
placed. The Operation has led to an
increase of vulnerability and,
probably, risky sexual practices and
gender-based violence. It has also
led to a disruption in HIV/AIDS
services, particularly ARV treat-
Principle
18
Principle
19
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eases, including AIDS, among
internally displaced persons.
2. To give effect to this right for
internally displaced persons, the
authorities concerned shall en-
sure that such persons, in par-
ticular displaced children, re-
ceive education which shall be
free and compulsory at the pri-
mary level. Education should
respect their cultural identity,
language and religion.
1. The primary duty and respon-
sibility for providing humanitar-
ian assistance to internally dis-
placed persons lies with national
authorities.
2. International humanitarian or-
ganizations and other appropri-
ate actors have the right to offer
their services in support of the
internally displaced. Such an of-
fer shall not be regarded as an
unfriendly act or an interference
in a State's internal affairs and
shall be considered in good faith.
Consent thereto shall not be arbi-
trarily withheld, particularly
when authorities concerned are
unable or unwilling to provide
the required humanitarian assis-
ment, home-based care and preven-
tion. Immediate consequences
likely include shortened life expec-
tancy and death owing to lack of
treatment and care in a situation
where life expectancy has already
dropped to only 33 years, malnutri-
tion and exposure to the elements.
Medium to long-term consequences
include increased transmission of
HIV, leading to higher infection
rates and a more rapid progression
of the disease that may only be de-
tected over the next few years.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 39.
An estimated 113,000 children aged
between 5 and 11 while 109,000
children aged 12-18 were directly
affected by the Operation. While
there is, at present, no means of as-
sessing the number of children not
attending school as a result of the
Operation, the UN inter-agency
working group on the protection of
children has reported that school
enrollment may have dropped by
about 25% following the Operation.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 41.
The Government has several times
stopped assistance being provided
to people near demolition sites, and
nearly two months into the crisis,
the United Nations has been unable
to survey humanitarian needs in co-
ordination with the authorities.
Some NGOs and UN agencies are
concerned their office premises
could be earmarked for demolition.
And some donors have concerns
that aid channeled though Govern-
ment might indirectly support poli-
cies to which they are opposed.
These constraints have now been
compounded by the burgeoning im-
pact of the Operation Restore Or-
der, a prevailing political climate of
mistrust and fear, and the lack of
Principle
23
Principle
25
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tance.
3. All authorities concerned shall
grant and facilitate the free pas-
sage of humanitarian assistance
and grant persons engaged in the
provision of such assistance
rapid and unimpeded access to
I the internally displaced.
Principle
30
All authorities concerned shall
grant and facilitate for interna-
tional humanitarian organiza-
tions and other appropriate ac-
tors, in the exercise of their
respective mandates, rapid and
unimpeded access to internally
displaced persons to assist in
their return or resettlement and
reintegration.
information on, and access to the
affected population.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 51.
The Government has, on several
occasions, prevented humanitarian
actors from providing shelter and
basic services to the displaced
population, particularly near the
demolition sites, even though many
of the affected persons remain
without any form of shelter or ready
means of sustenance. It has also
impeded data collection. Lack of
access is therefore a serious obsta-
cle to humanitarian action, with
significant, adverse consequences
for the affected populations.
Almost two months into the crisis,
it has not been possible for the
United Nations to conduct any
comprehensive assessment of hu-
manitarian needs in coordination
with the authorities. Lack of infor-
mation on the number of people af-
fected, their profile, and their
whereabouts makes programming,
coordination and resource mobiliza-
tion extremely difficult and oner-
ous.
Tibaijuka, supra note 13, at 53.
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